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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States income tax law imposes a tax on a corporation's
profits and also assesses a tax on dividends shareholders receive from
the corporation.' This "classical double tax system" has prevailed
despite commentators' repeated calls for integration of the individual
and corporate tax systems.2 The Department of the Treasury and the
Reporter for an American Law Institute recently joined those commenta-
tors supporting integration.' This article evaluates the entity tax, the
related double tax, and the integration proposals using an agency cost
analysis. Further, this article proposes, as an alternative to current inte-
gration models, a deferred distributions tax on undistributed profits
instead of the current entity tax.
Part II of this article justifies the Code's incorporation of both
entity taxation and passthrough taxation under an agency cost analysis.
Part II first enumerates the agency costs that occur because the manager
acts with an eye toward her personal tax situation as an investor. The
article then focuses on the agency costs resulting from the manager act-
ing in her role as manager. These latter conflicts dominate this article's
justification of the entity tax.4 Then Part II looks briefly at the unique
agency costs inherent in tax loss entities. Finally, Part II offers guide-
lines for determining when an organization should serve as a pass-
through entity and when entity taxation is the better choice. The
presentation emphasizes the role of investors as managers, laborers, or
passive investors, and the nature of entity as capital-intensive, labor-
intensive, or merely passive.
The agency cost justification for the double tax is explored in Part
1. I.R.C. § 11 (West 1992) (tax imposed on corporations); I.R.C. § 301(c) (West 1992)
(dividend included in shareholder's income).
2. See, e.g., Charles E. McLure, Jr., Integration of the Personal and Corporate Income
Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals, 88 HARV. L. REV. 532 (1975);
Scott A. Taylor, Corporate Integration in the Federal Income Tax: Lessons From the Past and a
Proposal for the Future, 10 VA. TAX REV. 237 (1990); Alvin Warren, The Relation and
Integration of Individual and Corporate Income Taxes, 94 HARV. L. REV. 717 (1981).
3. DEP'T OF TREASURY, REPORT ON INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX
SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE (1992); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Integration of the
Individual and Corporate Income Taxes, A.L.I. FED. INCOME TAX PROJECT 1 (1993).
4. Professors Hideki Kanda and Saul Levmore have used agency cost analysis to evaluate
the double tax. See generally Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Taxes, Agency Costs, and the Price
of Incorporation, 77 VA. L. REV. 211 (1991). Two significant differences exist between this
article and Kanda and Levmore's piece. First, this article views the major agency cost as resulting
from the manager's control of cash distributions needed to pay any resulting tax obligations,
whereas Professors Kanda and Levmore consider the financing of the tax liability as a neutral
consideration. Id. at 236-37. Second, this article concludes that the greatest source of agency cost
between the manager and the outside investors occurs when the manager acts in her role as
manager, whereas Professors Kanda and Levmore see the conflict as greater when the manager
acts with an eye toward her personal tax situation as an investor. Id. at 230.
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III. This Part recognizes the federal government's interest in collecting
tax revenue and its legitimate goal of receiving at least the present value
of all outstanding tax obligations. Initially, Part III evaluates the Treas-
ury's current corporation-shareholder integration proposals under
agency cost concerns. Next, Part III offers, as an innovative alternative
to the Treasury's current integration proposals, a single tax on distribu-
tions the investors receive from the firm, coupled with a deferred distri-
butions tax on the realized profits retained in the firm. The discussion
characterizes the current tax on earned profits as too imprecise for cur-
rent tax policies, which demand a stricter adherence to time value of
money concepts. Assessing a deferred distributions tax on undistributed
profits satisfies time value of money concerns and balances agency cost
tensions.
II. JUSTIFICATION FOR ENTITY TAXATION AND PASSTHROUGH
TAXATION
After briefly setting out background material and introducing terms
and concepts, Part II justifies both the entity tax and passthrough taxa-
tion in the same taxing regime under an agency cost analysis. Business
organizations are an aggregation of persons who associate with the
objective of making a profit. 5 The business organization as a legal fic-
tion clothes a series of contractual interrelationships.6 Many persons
have interests in any business organization, including investors, manag-
ers, employees, creditors, suppliers, and customers. Each participant
views the organization from a different perspective, and each has differ-
ent, and at times conflicting, objectives.7 Often, especially for closely-
held organizations, the investors also manage or otherwise labor in the
business.' For larger, more complex organizations, the investors are
persons different from the managers and other employees, although
there may be some overlap. Investors are usually the residual equity
holders and are considered the owners of the organization. 9
Investors historically chose the corporate form to save taxes.10
Corporate rates lower than individual rates, the corporation's power to
defer distributing earnings as dividends, and the shareholders' ability to
recognize the retained earnings (and untaxed value appreciation) as tax-
favored capital gains by selling the stock often resulted in a lower over-
5. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2) (as amended in 1983).
6. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11 (1976).
7. Id. at 307.
8. HARRY G. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 694 (3d ed. 1983).
9. Id. at 383.
10. Kanda & Levmore, supra note 4, at 214.
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all tax burden than a single tax at the individual's tax rate." Between
1986 and 1992 the tax environment became less friendly to sharehold-
ers: maximum corporate rates exceeded maximum individual tax rates
12
and long-term capital gains were not accorded the degree of tax-favored
treatment enjoyed prior to 1986.13 Congress in 1993 partially restored
the pre-1986 situation. For one, maximum corporate rates again are
lower than maximum individual rates.' 4 In addition, capital gains once
again garner privileged treatment.'5
The graduated tax benefit remains a potentially more significant
benefit, especially for smaller firms. Corporations pay only fifteen per-
cent of taxable income up to $50,000 taxable income and only twenty-
five percent of taxable income between $50,000 and $75,000.16 There-
fore, by incorporating rather than conducting business in a passthrough
entity such as a partnership, owners can take advantage of the lower
corporate tax rates. Shareholders who are also employees can maximize
the advantage of both the graduated corporate tax rate and the graduated
individual rate by adjusting salaries and bonuses. Current law restricts
the potential for more successful corporations to benefit from the gradu-
ated rate by phasing out the graduated rate for corporations having taxa-
ble incomes in excess of $100,0001' and by denying the use of the
graduated rates for certain personal service corporations engaged in
health, law, engineering, architecture, accounting, actuarial science, per-
forming arts, and consulting.' 8 Manufacturing and sales corporations
with taxable incomes under $100,000 still benefit from the corporate
graduated rates.
11. Recognition deferral of dividend income or capital gains resulted in tax liability being
delayed. The tax savings calculation made by tax practitioners was to discount to present value
the tax liability of deferred distributions and compare that amount to the tax liability if the
earnings were currently distributed. See Kanda & Levmore, supra note 4, at 214.
12. Compare I.R.C. § J (West 1992) (maximum individual rate of 31%) with I.R.C. § 11
(West 1992) (maximum corporate rate of 34%).
13. Compare I.R.C. § 1(h) (West 1993) (taxing capital gains at a 28% rate) with I.R.C.
§ 1202(a) (West 1985) (repealed 1986) (allowing a 60% deduction on capital gains).
14. Individual rates (39.6%) again will exceed maximum corporate rates (35%). Revenue
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, §§ 13202(a), 13221(a), 107 Stat. 312, 461, 477.
15. The maximum rate on net capital gains for individuals is 28%, so a taxpayer in the 39.6%
marginal tax bracket experiences an 11.6% absolute savings and a 29% relative tax savings
compared with the taxes on ordinary income. This rate differential once more may encourage
transmutation of ordinary income to capital gains.
16. I.R.C. § 11(b) (West 1992). An added historical tax benefit for corporations and their
shareholders was the waiver of the double tax on distributions in liquidations. However, this is no
longer the rule. See BORIS I. BrTTKER & JAMES S. EuSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 7.21, at 7-52 to -53 (5th ed. 1987).
17. See I.R.C. § l(b)(l) (West 1992).
18. See I.R.C. §§ 11(b)(2), 448(d)(2)(A) (West 1992).
[Vol. 48:1
DEFERRED DISTRIBUTIONS TAX
A. Terms and Concepts Defined
A manager who is also an investor may consider her personal situa-
tion in making decisions for the organization as long as the decisions fall
within the range of reasonable business decisions subject to the discre-
tion afforded the manager under the business judgment rule.' 9 Even if
the manager sacrifices her own personal well-being to benefit the busi-
ness, her decisions could have a disparate impact on the various inves-
tors. Individual investors, therefore, could disagree among themselves
on actions taken or contemplated by the manager.
Commentators have labelled as "residual loss" the divergence
between the benefit the outside investor (principal) would receive if the
manager (agent) acts to the investor's optimal benefit and the benefit the
outside investor would receive if the manager instead acts to her own
optimal benefit.20 Residual loss plus the costs of preventing any loss to
the principal is the agency cost.2 The term "investors" includes inside
investors, who are the managers, and outside investors, who are passive
capital providers with no input into management. For tax purposes the
conflict between managers and outside investors occurs because the
managers make decisions that affect both the managers' and the outside
investors' tax circumstances.
One set of management decisions relates to the organization's busi-
ness operations. These operational or in-firm decisions have been
labeled disposition decisions or policies.22 Any decision resulting in
taxable profits or losses would affect an investor's tax situation if the
organization serves as a conduit passing all income and loss directly to
the investors' individual tax returns.23 The agency cost may be espe-
cially high if the manager is in a different tax bracket from some or all
of the outside investors-this is almost certainly the case in publicly
held corporations-and makes business decisions with an eye toward
her own tax situation.24
A second set of conflicts, called distribution decisions or policies,25
arises when the manager decides whether to distribute money to the
19. See Kanda & Levmore, supra note 4, at 230-31.
20. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 6, at 308.
21. Id. The terminology defines the loss from the principal's viewpoint. The terminology
could view the transactions from the manager's point of view and be considered a constituency
cost or an outside investor cost. Alternatively, it may be viewed neutrally as cooperative effort
cost or cost of conflict. This article prefers "conflict" or "tension" but uses "agency cost" as the
dominant label.
22. Kanda & Levmore, supra note 4, at 233.
23. Any income passed through to the individual investor would increase the individual
taxpayer's taxable income; any loss could reduce the taxpayer's income base.
24. Id. at 232.
25. Id. at 233.
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investors (both inside investors and outside investors). If the managers
and outside investors are in dissimilar tax situations and the investors are
taxed on the distributions, as shareholders are in corporations, a tension
develops concerning the timing and amount of the distributions.26 Some
high-bracket investors, for example, may prefer that the manager retain
the available funds in the organization, even if the pre-tax return is less
than the return from other investments.27 Likewise, conflicts may arise
between investors in passthrough entities, such as partnerships, because
the investors may want or need distributions to satisfy the resulting tax
liabilities. 28 The tension escalates if the taxpayers are in dissimilar mar-
ginal tax brackets and, therefore, need different amounts to pay the tax
on similar amounts of income.29
The conflict concerning distributions on passthrough entities based
on the individual owner's tax situation serves to explain a great deal
about entity classification and investor choice of organizational form for
tax purposes. The conflict arises from the imposition of tax liability on
the individual owners, who must pay the tax. Wherewithal to make pay-
ment constitutes a concern for both the policymaking government and
the taxpaying citizen.30 As between the outside investors and the man-
ager, outside investors reasonably could look to the activity that is the
source of income generating the liability to obtain the funds to pay for
the increased tax. A conflict occurs when the manager is unwilling to
make the necessary distributions or disagrees about the amount of distri-
bution necessary to satisfy each investor's tax liability. The conflict
intensifies the difference among each investor's tax and financial situa-
tion. For example, a taxpayer in the 15% marginal tax bracket may
demand at least $1500 distribution to pay the tax on her $10,000 share of
the organization's taxable income, whereas a taxpayer in the 39.6% mar-
ginal bracket will demand $3960 to satisfy her liability on her $10,000
share of taxable income.
Characterizing the manager's decisions as in-firm disposition deci-
sions and distribution decisions serves a limited analytical purpose. Dis-
position decisions include investment decisions. Managers having finite
resources at their disposal often must decide between investing assets in
26. Id. at 234.
27. Id.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 61-76.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 30-31 (two taxpayers each with $10,000 taxable
income may owe taxes of $1500 and $3960 respectively).
30. As a political matter, Congress would be hard-pressed to impose passthrough treatment
upon owners when faced with the image of a retired widow forced to pay the taxes on her share of
a firm's income out of her social security check because she did not receive any dividends and
was not in a position to affect the firm's decision to make distributions to her.
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the firm or making distributions to investors. Rather than attempting to
classify this choice as a disposition decision or a distribution decision,
this article recognizes the choice simply as one potentially creating a
conflict between the manager and the outside investors.
As a matter of tax policy, the government should consider an indi-
vidual as having the resources to pay the tax on his share of a firm's
income only if he receives cash, a cash equivalent, or another asset
directly from the firm to pay the resulting tax; if, at minimum, he has the
power to effect a distribution to him from the firm; or if for some other
articulable reason the taxed individual is deemed to have waived his
right to receive distributions. 3' Managers have the power to control dis-
tributions. Passive outside investors do not. Since Congress created this
conflict in enacting the tax laws, Congress should be sensitive to ways to
reduce the agency costs resulting from the imposition of the tax.
B. Reducing Agency Costs: The Manager as Inside Investor
Recognizing the agency costs associated with taxing business orga-
nizations is only the first step in the analysis. This Part examines how
agency costs affect policy decisions regarding the taxation of business
organizations. The significant inquiry considers whether the tax laws
should treat all business organizations as taxable entities, whether the
laws should treat all business organizations as conduits and impose a tax
only on individual owners, or whether the laws should provide for both
taxed entities and passthrough entities as it does now.
This Part does not address double taxation of business income, 32
nor does it consider the merits of integration proposals. 33 The inquiry
here addresses whether and how the tax laws should adjust for the
31. A second approach evaluates the individual's interest in the business or transaction or
rights resulting from the transaction to determine if they may be converted to cash within the tax
paying cycle. See generally CARL THOMAS DEVINE, Recognition Requirements-Income Earned
and Realized, in 2 EssAYS IN AccoUNrING THEORY 57, 62 (1985). If the interest or rights may be
converted to cash, arguably the individual should recognize the income. For example, an
individual can borrow against a note or sell stock listed on a stock exchange. Yet, in many cases,
the individual cannot locate a purchaser or lender for certain assets because the risk of not
receiving distributions from the activity is great, the individual cannot locate a willing purchaser
easily, or the business arrangement forecloses transferability. Under the conflicts or agency
theory, however, the issue turns on the degree of conflict between management and outside
investors on distributions from the firm. Reliance on outside or indirect sources of funding does
not reduce the conflict significantly, especially if funding the tax liability requires the individual to
sell some or all of her interest in the organization. Financing and liquidity are discussed more
fully infra at text accompanying notes 61-75.
32. See infra text accompanying note 118 (agency cost justification for the double tax).
33. See infra text accompanying notes. 122-144 (evaluating current integration proposals).
The article proposes an alternative to current integration proposals and to current double taxation
justifications. See infra text accompanying notes 145-178 (proposing a deferred distributions tax
on undistributed profits).
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agency costs resulting from the imposition of the income tax. One
assumption made of necessity is that each investor ultimately has a per-
centage right to the profits and assets of the organization even though
the right to current possession is subject to management's discretion.34
An investor owning five percent of an organization under this assump-
tion would be taxed on five percent of the organization's income and
have that five percent of income added to the amount she could with-
draw from the operations some later time. The organization's income is
in fact her income and the organization's assets, though under the man-
agement of another, are her assets. As a corollary, any taxes paid are
deemed paid on the investor's share of the tax liability.".
As noted, the government should when feasible accommodate the
investors' attempts to reduce agency costs arising from the govern-
ment's imposition of taxes.36 The federal government is directly
involved in creating this conflict because of the income tax laws. This
strong nexus justifies, or maybe even compels, the government to mini-
mize, or to allow the investors and managers to minimize, the conflict.37
The government's willingness to accommodate stems from the inves-
tors' inability to demand immediate distributions to pay resulting tax
liabilities. As long as the present value of total taxes paid on the organi-
zational income are at least as great as the taxes paid if the investors
report the income directly, the government should be neutral regarding
who pays the tax.38
Since under this scenario the government remains neutral, individ-
ual investors' decisions about disposition of assets in a passthrough
organization would differ according to each investor's individual tax sit-
uation, including anticipated changes in individual tax circumstances.
34. Another theory treats the outside investors as little more than special creditors of the firm
or of the manager. This theory would eliminate most entities from passing through income and
losses to outside investors (although it might permit or mandate passthrough to managers).
35. Theoretically, this deemed payment of the investor's tax liability may be a constructive
dividend. To date, however, no tax has been imposed on this type of dividend. Instead, dividends
relate to actual distributions to or for the benefit of shareholders, excluding tax assessed against
the entity. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929), can be distinguished
since the payment there was for the tax on a president's compensation.
36. See supra text accompanying note 31.
37. Several current provisions tax the entity and refuse to tax the investor until the investor
receives a distribution.
38. But see Rebecca S. Rudnick, Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?,
39 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 965, 1074-81 (1989) (noting arguments that corporations should pay an
additional tax because corporations have unique attributes that generate excess profits or because a
tax on corporations facilitates the allocation and taxation of income from corporations with
foreign investors). Professor Rudnick concludes these are not appropriately neutral rationales for
a double tax on corporations. Id. at 1066. She prefers a power to dispose of income rationale
(presumably meaning power to dispose of increased assets). Id. at 1081-93. According to
Professor Rudnick, the agency cost theory is at the heart of this rationale. Id. at 1085-86.
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Individual investors' tax circumstances, for example, may be such that
some investors would prefer to accelerate or defer disposing of an asset
so that the disposition would occur in a more favorable tax year. Fur-
ther, because many individual investor preferences will be random, any
managerial disposition decision will benefit some investors and disad-
vantage others.
With full knowledge of her own circumstances, of course, the man-
ager could and might act to affect the timing of income or loss to mini-
mize her own tax liability. Taxing the organization as a separate entity,
rather than allowing passthrough treatment, would eliminate this conflict
because one tax schedule would apply to the entity, and the manager's
decisions would be based on the organization's tax circumstances rather
than her own.
A second, related suboptimal economic consequence of pass-
through taxation eliminated by taxing the organization rather than the
individual investors occurs if the manager would make economically
inefficient disposition decisions because her personal tax benefits would
exceed her share of the organization's economic efficiency losses.39 To
illustrate, assume a firm owns an asset with a basis of fifty and a fair
market value of 100, and an available asset at a price of ninety substi-
tutes perfectly for the owned machine.4" If the firm sells the owned
asset and the firm is a passthrough entity, the manager must recognize
and pay tax on her share of the gain. The tax owed, compared with the
present value of the same tax owed if the asset is sold several years in
the future, likely exceeds the manager's economic gain from utilizing
the replacement asset currently.4" She therefore might defer selling the
asset to the economic detriment of outside investors who may prosper by
selling the owned asset and purchasing the replacement asset. Taxing
the organization instead of the investors eliminates the conflict between
the manager and the outside investors with dissimilar tax situations. The
income tax consequences considered are those based upon the entity's
tax situation and not on the manager's or other investors' tax
circumstances.42
To summarize, the imposition of the income tax directly on an
organization's investors gives rise to agency costs between the manager
and the outside investors. The agency costs occurring between the man-
39. See Kanda & Levmore, supra note 4, at 230.
40. Id. at 230 n.45.
41. Id.
42. Taxing the organization does not guarantee that the manager will sell the owned asset and
purchase the replacement asset. The manager will decide based on the entity's tax situation, and
the entity's tax situation may convert what would be an economically efficient choice into an
inefficient one. Taxes affect the decisionmaking process.
19931
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ager as inside investor and the outside investors result from the man-
ager's making disposition decisions based to some degree on her
personal tax situation and its difference from that of the outside inves-
tors. Two predominant decision conflicts occur. First, the manager can
affect the amount or character of income of an entity by timing transac-
tions and choosing ones suited to her personal tax situation. Usually this
personal situation is contingent upon her marginal tax rate. The outside
investors may favor a different decision based on their personal tax
situations.
The manager may refuse to make an optimal economic asset dispo-
sition because the tax costs to the manager more than offset her eco-
nomic benefit from the sale of the asset. Some outside investors, on the
other hand, would benefit from disposal of the asset. Taxing the organi-
zation as a separate entity eliminates this conflict by emphasizing one
tax structure, that of the entity, rather than the tax rates of the individual
investors.
The above discussion assumes a progressive tax rate structure.43
Today the tax rates range between 28% and 39.6% for those individuals
most likely to be investors," especially for those who are managers of
businesses with significant numbers of investors. Therefore, the rate
variance could be a possible absolute 11.6% and a relative 29% differ-
ence between shareholders. For those managers who reasonably should
be in the same marginal tax bracket each year, the incidence of conflict
situations affecting timing may be minimized. In addition, because most
individual investors will be in the same rate bracket as the manager, the
conflicts may not surface.
Taxing the entity rather than the investor may not eliminate all
agency costs caused by taxation, however, even if the tax rates were
steeply progressive and the manager's tax situation reasonably could be
expected to change annually. The tax on the entity merely puts all
investors in the same tax circumstance. The cost of this conflict reduc-
43. See Kanda & Levmore, supra note 4, at 229.
44. Taxpayers must pay tax at the 28% rate when their taxable income reaches $36,900 for
married persons filing joint returns, $29,600 for heads of households, $22,100 for single persons,
and $18,450 for married persons filing separate returns. Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993,
Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13201(a), 107 Stat. 311 (1993). Many individual shareholders will be
subject to the higher 36% bracket ($140,000 income for married individuals) and 39.6% bracket
($250,000 income for married individuals). Id. At least three exceptions apply. Many tax-
exempt organizations may owe no tax on income and hence will always be in a low tax bracket.
Congress may change this result by imposing a tax on these entities for income from investments
as unrelated business taxable income. See I.R.C. § 511 (West 1992). Additionally, some retired
individuals' taxable income may fall below the amount required to be subject to the 28% marginal
rate. Finally, corporate investors are subject to a separate rate schedule and may have a higher or
lower rate than managers do. The corporate rate differential would be irrelevant, of course, if all
income passed through to individual investors.
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tion, however, is a change in after-tax return for each investor. If the tax
rate on the entity would result in the same amount of tax as assessing the
individual investors, then the entity tax would result in a lower after-tax
return than would conduit taxation for some investors and a higher after-
tax return for others. Those investors receiving a lower after-tax return
based on entity taxation should compare that return against the return on
passthrough taxation, based upon knowledge that the manager may
make business decisions considering the manager's personal situation.
For many, the relatively minimal effect of an asset disposition, for
example, compared to the recurring operational income, would not jus-
tify the loss in after-tax return from the investment taxed as a
corporation.45
The determinative equation would balance the costs of the entity
tax against the individual investors' rates. For those investors subject to
a tax rate lower thati the corporate rate, the after-tax return with an entity
tax would be less than if they were subject to passthrough taxation. The
equation is skewed more to a passthrough choice because most firms'
operational income and expenses flow from recurring business transac-
tions that are not susceptible to manipulative managerial choices.
For investors to choose an entity tax rather than a passthrough
regime, the effective marginal tax rate on the entity cannot be much
greater than the lowest rate paid by most individual investors. The rate,
however, would be higher than zero. Actual experience would dictate
the expected lowest rate experienced by most investors. The entity rate
would need to be as low as the marginal rate experienced by a substan-
tial majority of actual investors. The higher the entity tax rate, the more
potential investors will opt for conduit treatment. At some point the
costs of the entity tax would exceed the savings in agency costs.
46
C. Reducing Agency Costs: The Manager as Manager
More significant than the conflict between the outside investors and
the manager as an inside investor is the conflict between the outside
investors and the manager in her role as manager.
47
45. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Deregulation of Limited Liability and the Death of
Partnership, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 471 (1992) (concluding that the combination of
circumstances required to justify agency cost analysis is sufficiently unlikely that firms rarely
would choose a two-tier tax).
46. The importance of the lower entity rate becomes more significant and will be discussed
more fully later in Part III, infra notes 145-61 and accompanying text.
47. "Since the relationship between the stockholders and manager of a corporation fit the
definition of a pure agency relationship it should be no surprise to discover that the issues
associated with the 'separation of ownership and control' in the modem diffuse ownership
corporation are intimately associated with the general problem of agency." Jensen & Meckling,
supra note 6, at 309.
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1. OUTSIDE INVESTORS' TAX COST ON MANAGER'S
NONPECUNIARY BENEFITS
The manager may choose to spend the money under her control on
nonpecuniary benefits.48 The manager, for example, may furnish her
office with plush carpet rather than install a tile floor and invest the
difference in costs of the two floor coverings in income-producing or
debt-reducing activities. The list of nonpecuniary benefits could be
extensive: size, location, and furnishing of office, perquisites to
employees to foster loyalty or respect, country club membership, pres-
tige automobile, car phone, ability to select friends and family as suppli-
ers, and choice of causes for charitable donations, to name a few.49
The nonpecuniary benefits cause a nontax conflict since the man-
48. Id. at 312-13.
49. See id. at 312. The manager's pecuniary benefits could intensify the conflict. For
example, a manager may receive a bonus based on the company's profitability. Assuming part of
the company's profitability is derived from invested capital, the manager will share the
profitability from assets retained in the company. The manager is better off by withdrawing her
bonus annually and investing the funds outside the company. She then keeps the full return on the
investment rather than only her profit percentage (plus her share as investor in the company). In
addition to the return on her investments from prior years, the manager continues to receive the
same bonus percentage from income on the capital retained in the business, including any
previously earned and taxed capital. The investors in a passthrough organization, therefore, pay
tax on retained income that becomes invested capital directly benefiting the manager rather than
the taxed investors.
To illustrate, the following example assumes that the investors have contributed $1,000,000
to the company, the company reports a pre-bonus profit of 20% of capital, and the manager
receives 10% of profits as a bonus and averages a 10% return on outside investments.
Earnings
Taxable On Manager's
Income Bonus Income Bonus Income
YEAR 1 $200,000 $20,000 $180,000 - $20,000
YEAR 2 $236,000 23,600 213,000. 2,000 25,600
YEAR 3 $278,600 27,860 250,740 4,560 32,420
YEAR 4 $328,748 32,875 295,873 7,802 40,077
YEAR 5 $387,923 38,792 359,131 11,810 50,002
YEAR 6 $459,749 45,975 413,774 16,812 62,787
YEAR 7 $542,504 54,250 488,254 23,091 77,341
YEAR 8 $640,155 64,015 576,140 30,825 94,840
YEAR 9 $755,383 75,538 679,845 40,309 15,847
YEAR 10 $891,352 89,135 802,217 51,894 141,029
In YEAR 1 the manager reports the same income from the bonus as would an investor own-
ing 11.1% of the profits interest in the company. Beginning in YEAR 2 the manager calculates
her bonus on returns from all capital, including that taxed to the investors in prior years. For
example, the $3600 increase in the manager's bonus in YEAR 2 is a return on $18,000 of the
profits taxed to investors in YEAR 1. The investors in a passthrough entity would have paid taxes
(approximately $5500 to $7200) on the $18,000 that benefits the manager. By YEAR 10 the
investors will have paid taxes cumulatively on $345,675 (or approximately $107,000 to $138,000
in taxes) to create a capital base, the return on which benefits the manager. The manager pays
taxes on the bonus each year; but in the example, she keeps all returns on the bonus in future
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ager bears only a proportionate share of the costs of the benefits she
chooses. A manager who owns the entire business makes choices based
on the benefit to her against the full cost of the benefit.50 If she owns
less than 100% of the business, she will balance the benefit against her
share of the cost.5" As the manager's share of equity falls, she will have
a tendency to spend larger amounts of the organization's funds on per-
quisites.52 Theoretically, the lower the manager's fractional ownership
interest in the organization, the more she will be encouraged to expend
more firm resources on her own working perquisites.53 The nontax
aspects of nonpecuniary benefits exist for both corporate and
noncorporate entities.
The manager's pursuit of nonpecuniary benefits also has its tax
conflict counterpart. The funds for the acquisition of the perquisites
come from the profits taxed to the investors. To the extent the manager
owns less than 100% of the business, the remaining investors are paying
tax on the manager's benefits. She enjoys or will enjoy these benefits
either personally or indirectly by determining which persons will receive
the benefits.54 The manager's use of business assets for her nonpecu-
years. This explains why she has $141,029 income in YEAR 10 while an owner of 11.1% profits
in the company would have only $89,046.
The potential for conflict exists in this situation especially if the manager, and not the inves-
tors, determines dispositions and distributions. The manager could make disposition decisions
maximizing her bonus without regard to the investors' tax situations. Likewise, the manager
would be tempted to retain much of the profits in the business to maximize the amount of profits,
and hence her bonus, without concern for how the investors will finance their tax liabilities. One
way to minimize the conflict is to distribute cash equal to all taxed income to the investors.
Alternatively, the contract with the manager could grant the manager an initial equity interest
instead of paying cash annually, could provide that the payments of the bonus amounts be
deferred until the manager no longer receives a bonus, or could require a proportionate distribu-
tion be made to investors for any distribution made to the manager. Either approach places the
manager and the investors in equivalent economic situations.
None of these options, however, may be acceptable. The manager may demand as part of her
compensation that she receive payments annually. Distributions of all profits to investors may be
financially inefficient for an on-going business. Another option is to tax the company as an entity
rather than as a passthrough. The analysis from here duplicates that in the text. By requiring the
manager to pay taxes out of business assets, the manager, as the person making both the disposi-
tion and distribution decisions, is responsible for financing the tax payment. The reduction of
assets moderates the leveraging effect of the transaction and forces the manager to consider the
costs of taxes in making any decisions. The investors then are not taxed until they recognize
income under some other provision, such as the sale of their interest or a distribution from
company.
50. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 6, at 312; discussion supra note 49; see also YuGI
IJIRI, THE FOUNDATIONS OF AccOUNTING MEASUREMENT: A MATHEMATICAL, ECONOMIC, AND
BEHAVIORAL INQUIRY 34-42 (1967) (discussing the effect of balancing the benefit of a decision
against the sacrifice necessary to receive the benefit).
51. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 6, at 312.
52. Id. at 313.
53. Id.
54. The manager also can invest the profits. in the business. Some investors would prefer that
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niary benefits, therefore, may cause conflicts between the manager and
the outside investors.
The conflicts may be minimized if the entity can deduct currently
the cost of the nonpecuniary benefit. Nonpecuniary benefits qualifying
as business expenses offset income dollar for dollar in the year paid."
Investors, therefore, are not assessed a tax for the profits expended. On
the other hand, the investors do suffer a tax liability for capitalizable
assets. Even if the investors are allowed cost recovery deductions in
future years, the present value of those deductions will be less than the
current tax costs. As an illustration, assume the organization reports a
$1 million profit, taxed directly to the investors. That same year,
because she frequently must travel to New York, Dallas, Chicago, and
Los Angeles on firm business, the manager buys and furnishes a condo-
minium in each city in the name of the organization at a total cost of $1
million. The annual cost recovery deduction under current provisions
will be approximately $32,000.56 The current year tax liability (assum-
ing here all investors have same marginal tax rate of 31%) is $310,000.
Tax savings for all years except the first year would be approximately
$9920.17 The present value, assuming a conservative six percent dis-
count rate of $9920 tax savings a year for 31.5 years is approximately
$139,000.58 The tax cost to the investors for the four condominiums,
therefore, is $171,000.51
The agency cost at issue here depends on cash flow to pay the
resulting tax liability and not on tax rates. A manager in a passthrough
organization may make disposition and reinvestment decisions based on
the economic costs and benefits to her. Since she bears the tax burden
the manager distribute all profits. To these investors, the retention of profits to be used in the
business as the manager decides (and not in investments the outside investors choose) could be an
agency cost. Since arguably the manager would invest the profits to achieve a return at least as
great as on any investment made by the investors, this particular conflict is not considered here.
55. I.R.C. §§ 162(a), 461(a) (1992).
56. I.R.C. § 168(a)-(d) (West 1992) (applicable recovery period for nonresidential real
property is thirty-one and a half years). The 1993 Act extends the recovery period to thirty-nine
years. Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13151(a) (codified at I.R.C.
§ 168(c)(1)). In the text example a firm may receive a higher current year deduction for any
furnishings that may be recovered over a shorter period of time. The $32,000 is used in text
serves for illustrative purposes; more precise calculations would not change the analysis.
57. Multiplying $32,000 by a 31% marginal rate results in a tax of $9920. At the highest rate
of 39.6%, the tax savings would be $12,672.
58. Present worth of an $9920 annuity at 6% for a term certain for thirty-one years is $9920 x
13.9291, or $138,177. For thirty-two years the present value is $9920 x 14.0840, or $139,713. At
39.6% rate, the present value will approximate $177,000. Factors taken from Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2031-10(f) (as amended in 1984) (Table B showing the present worth at 6% of an annuity for
a term certain, of an income interest for a term certain, and of a remainder interest postponed for a
term certain.)
59. The tax cost would be $219,000 if the 39.6% rate is applied.
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of only her percentage interest in the business income, the cost to her is
only a fraction of the total tax burden, even though she may be the only
significant beneficiary in the relevant time frame. Meanwhile, the
outside investors must pay their shares of the increased tax liability.
Thus, the manager may be inclined to make suboptimal economic dispo-
sition decisions because she benefits more than she is burdened. This
conclusion follows whether or not the manager is also an investor.
Taxing the entity does not prevent the manager from spending the
firm's money on nonpecuniary benefits, of course. Such taxation does
insulate the investors from expending their personal funds to pay taxes
on the income that will benefit the manager more than it does the tax-
paying investors. The proper taxpayer perhaps should be the manager,
but the Internal Revenue Code does not impose a tax in this situation.
Requiring the manager to use the funds under her control to pay the tax
may serve as a reasonable alternative. Although taxing the entity
reduces the agency costs arising when taxes must be paid on the income
used to acquire the capitalized benefit, it does serve to camouflage the
manager's inefficient use of the firm's funds. Arguably, however,
investors are more willing to accept the manager's enjoyment of nonpe-
cuniary benefits if they do not pay the tax on her benefits directly, even
though the payment of the tax from the firm's assets is an indirect inves-
tor payment.
2. MANAGER'S POWER TO COMMIT INVESTORS' NONFIRM ASSETS TO
SATISFY THE TAX ON THE FIRM'S INCOME
The greatest conflict, because of the absolute amount of money
involved, does not depend on the manager's disposition decisions or on
individual investors' tax rates. Rather, it concerns the payment of any
tax liability. An investor's annual tax liability for his share of an entity's
taxable income could be as high as his initial investment. The conflict
comprises two components: control over assets and financing.
a. Control over Assets
For business activities to be successful, investors must transfer to
managers the right to use, transmute, and otherwise dispose of assets.
Although a manager enjoys management or executive rights, the inves-
tors retain most beneficial or economic rights.6" A manager, however,
acts on behalf of not only investors but also creditors, government enti-
60. A manager enjoys nonpecuniary rights that deplete the investors' economic rights. The
manager also shares in economic rights indirectly by receiving salaries, bonuses, or other
incentives directly or indirectly based on the firm's financial performance. See supra text
accompanying notes 48-59.
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ties, community organizations, employees, and herself. A manager,
therefore, covets sufficient liquid assets in the business for purposes
other than to pay taxes or make distributions to investors. The more
assets, especially liquid assets, a manager controls, the more options the
manager has for adjusting to market opportunities and downturns.
Although technically the manager, especially in the corporation-share-
holder context, cannot require investors to contribute additional capital
to the business activity, she can force investors in a passthrough entity to
use outside funds to pay tax liabilities. Thus, she indirectly has benefi-
cial access to these extra assets and can retain assets for use in the busi-
ness that otherwise would go to satisfy tax obligations.
The assets retained in the firm from profits are generated through a
pricing policy that considered taxes. A firm paying the tax at the entity
level must factor in the tax effects in its break-even, pricing, and cash
flow analyses. A passthrough firm can soften the impact of taxes in its
managerial decisionmaking process, but managers will consider their
particular tax needs in setting prices. Even firms that do not consciously
adjust for taxes compare their prices against firms that do set prices to
cover anticipated tax liability and will move their prices toward those
charged by competitors, if for no other reason than to maximize profits.
Profits for passthrough entities, therefore, should contain planned
amounts for taxes. If the manager retains the tax-attributable profits
rather than distributing them to investors, the manager has increased the
amount of working capital under her control. The manager thus has the
power to use the outside investors' financial assets held outside the busi-
ness to enable her to use all the assets in the organization to her best
benefit.
The manager's retaining the tax component of firm profits while
not distributing money to investors to cover the tax liability multiplies
the funds available to the manager as it decreases the assets under the
investors' direct control. Taxing the organization as an entity instead of
as a passthrough ameliorates the leveraging elements that contribute to
this conflict. Entity taxation reduces an agency cost simply by reducing
the assets subject to the manager's use. The manager actually must use
the tax component of the firm's profits to pay the firm's tax liability.
Taxing the entity forces the manager to consider the tax consequences of
her decisions. Satisfying a tax obligation reduces the assets at her dispo-
sal and thus circumscribes many reinvestment decisions. A manager not
responsible for paying the taxes will tend to enter into more taxable
transactions than would a manager responsible for the taxes. As the pos-
sible number and frequency of transactions that lose their economic
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desirability when the tax costs are considered increases, the agency costs
to investors also rise. Entity taxation minimizes these agency costs.
b. Financing the Tax Liability
In a passthrough system, investors must use nonfirm assets to pay
the tax liability attributable to the firm's business income. Generally,
investors expect firm obligations to be paid with firm assets.6' Investors
with limited liability, such as shareholders or limited partners, are not
liable for any firm debts.62 Even general partners reasonably can expect
the firm to exhaust firm assets to satisfy firm debts before requiring the
investors to satisfy firm obligations with nonfirm assets.63  Requiring
investors to pay the tax liability on the firm's profits without a concomi-
tant immediate right to the firm's assets abrogates the general rule that
the firm's assets should be used to satisfy debts originating in the firm's
business.
The explanation for this predicament is relatively simple. Once the
executive rights and economic rights to an entity's property are bifur-
cated, with investors having only residual rights while the manager has
executive rights including the rights to distribute property to investors or
to retain property in the business, there is no guarantee that the investors
who pay the tax can receive distributions from the firm to pay the tax.' 4
For many investors, their inability to demand distributions to sat-
isfy tax liabilities resulting from reporting their share of the entity's tax-
able income creates a conflict between the investors and the manager.
One way to reduce this conflict involves contractually requiring distribu-
tions to satisfy any tax liability. But the probability that each investor
will incur different rates of tax liability creates yet more conflict over the
amount each investor should receive. Requiring the manager to dis-
tribute money to each investor of record equal to the maximum tax an
61. Even partners expect partnership debts be paid with partnership assets before resort to
partners' separate assets. See 2 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND
RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIPS §§ 5.08(c)-(f) (1991).
62. The shareholders or limited partners, of course, may contract for greater liability, but the
general rule is that they limit their liability to their assets held in the organization, including their
initial contribution, retained profits, and appreciation in value of firm assets. See MODEL
Busmnmss CORP. Acr § 6.22 (1984); REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 303(a) (1976).
63. See, e.g., 2 BROMBERO & RiBSTEIN, supra note 61, §§ 5.08(e)-(f).
64. Arguably, the most significant property right for taxation purposes is the right to control
the property that is the source of the income or that represents the wealth accretion or profits
during the year. That right is controlled by the manager, not the investors. Perhaps we ought to
rethink who should be taxed on entity income. Managers could be taxed (assuming we could
determine with some specificity for each business entity which managers should be taxed and for
how much), and investors could be treated as creditors. Yet the generally accepted premise is that
the manager controls the property for the ultimate benefit of the investors and should not be liable
personally for taxes on the income generating that property.
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investor may owe for his share of the firm's income serves as a viable
variation to the solution. Managers might balk at this solution as deplet-
ing an excessive amount of the firm's needed finances. Another varia-
tion would require the manager to pay the tax on the investors' behalf.
The manager would adjust the equity accounts of each investor for taxes
paid on behalf of the investor. Administratively, determining the
amount of tax owed for each investor may prove impracticable for many
widely-held entities.65 A final solution is to tax the business entity
rather than the investors. Under this analysis, investors would choose
entity taxation when the company is expected to retain cash flow in the
operations rather than make distributions.
3. IMPORTANCE OF LIQUIDITY
a. Agency Costs and Financing
The emphasis on funding the tax liability centers upon the inves-
tor's liquidity and his ability to pay. This article limits the investor's
relevant funds available to pay his tax attributable to income from the
firm to those funds originating in the firm. Thus, the investor is deemed
liquid only if he receives cash, a cash equivalent, or other asset directly
from the firm sufficient to pay the resulting tax. If, at minimum, he has
the power to effect a distribution to himself from the firm, or if the taxed
individual waived his right to receive distributions while accepting the
tax consequences of passthrough taxation, the investor is deemed liquid
for this purpose. The investor's excess funds outside the investment,66
the investor's ability to borrow against his interest in the activity, or the
investor's right to sell part or all of his interest are considered irrelevant.
On the other hand, some have argued that financing is not a troub-
ling situation unless the manager makes suboptimal investments.67 Until
then, financing is a neutral issue. According to this reasoning, an indi-
vidual investor's net worth is not changed by whether he pays tax
directly from his own funds or whether the organization pays the tax or
distributes money to the investor to cover the tax liability.68 The inves-
65. Currently, a firm's payments of tax on behalf of investors may be taxed as dividends paid
to the investors. See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929). Under current
law this approach is not acceptable unless the organization qualifies as a conduit. Any legislative
revision requiring the entity to pay the tax on behalf of the investors should provide that the
payment of tax on behalf of the investors is not a dividend but merely a reduction of the investor's
basis in the entity.
66. The investor may consent or be deemed to have consented to using outside funds in
certain circumstances, such as where the investor is also the manager. The investor's consent
cannot be found, however, merely because the investor has access to these supplemental funds.
See infra text accompanying notes 69-76.




tor's net worth remains the same; only his investment mix is affected.
An investor with liquidity problems or who does not want to continue
using his own funds to pay the tax liability resulting from the organiza-
tion's operations can sell his investment or borrow against his increased
equity in the business.6 9
Financing the tax liability, however, is not a neutral consideration.
Under an agency cost analysis, the issue turns on the degree of conflict
between management and outside investors on distributions from the
firm.70 Finding a source of liquid funds to satisfy the tax liability when
the manager refuses to authorize distributions can create a conflict.
Reliance on outside or indirect sources of funding does not reduce the
conflict significantly, especially if funding the tax liability requires the
individual to sell some or all of her interest in the organization or some
other nonliquid investment.7'
Borrowing against increased equity may not be an automatic option
for many passive investors in nonpubicly-traded businesses.72 Taxable
income and financial income reflect accounting choices and may not
reflect actual changes in the firm's value.73 A passive investor may lack
access to sufficiently meaningful data to justify a banker's willingness to
lend solely on the firm's balance sheet and income statement.74 Like-
wise, the lender has greater monitoring costs associated with closely
held businesses. Minority discounts and marketability discounts also
affect the value of a business.75
b. Agency Costs and Transaction Costs of Financing the Tax
Liability
Even if the manager's disposition and reinvestment decisions are
69. See id. at 236.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 59-66.
71. If liquidity to pay the tax is irrelevant because the investors are neutral as to form of their
wealth and can sell their interests in the entity, the ironic result is that publicly traded corporations
with predictable earnings would best be taxed as conduits because little if any conflicts occur,
whereas smaller businesses, with interests that have limited or no marketability, would best be
taxed as entities. Taking the opposite approach, Professor Rudnick has suggested that liquidity-
the ability to sell the interest in an organization relatively quickly and without a significant loss of
capital value in the exchange-is the underlying basis for recognizing the entity as a separate
taxable person from its investors and also for the taxation of both the entity and its investors.
Rudnick, supra note 38, at 1127-32.
72. "The value of a partial interest in a business or practice may be equal to, more than, or
less than a proportionate share of the value of a 100 percent interest in the business on practice."
SHANNON P. PRATT, VALUING SMALL BUSINESSES AND PROFESSIONAL PRACICES 266 (1986).
73. Cf. HARRY SIMONS, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 21 (Jay M. Smith ed., 1992) (stating that
alternative valuation methods may be interchanged).
74. For some items a lender may consider, see generally PRATT, supra note 72, at 28-118.
75. Id. at 267.
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made without an eye to her personal tax or economic situation and the
return from investing the tax liability dollars through the business organ-
ization is the same as the return from each outside investor's separate
investment, taxing the organization rather than the investors reduces
financing costs. If all investors have adequate liquid funds, financing
costs would approximate the loss of income from investing the funds.
Assuming the business organization would net the same return on
investment as the individual investors would, the investors should be
neutral regarding entity or conduit taxation if the rates of tax are the
same on the entity and the individual. Otherwise, the investors presuma-
bly would favor a scheme with the lowest immediate tax liability.
On the other hand, the financing cost may exist. Loan charges or
costs associated with the sale of assets may be significant. Likewise,
financing the tax liability may create anxiety as well as loss of time.
Some investors may approach their credit limits and be forced to forego
business or personal opportunities. A manager may not be concerned
with investors' financing costs7 6 and may make disposition decisions
without concern for the outside investors' tax plight. A manager of a
taxed organization, on the other hand, must contemplate financing any
tax liability. The emotional and time commitments inherent in financing
the tax liability falls then on the manager rather than on the individual
outside investors. The most efficient method for resolving the conflict
and reducing agency costs involves placing the responsibility for reduc-
ing the costs on the person in control of creating the conflict: in this
case, the manager.
D. Agency Costs in Tax Loss Entities
One theory regarding the management of business entity taxation
suggests that investors and managers would prefer any organizational
form for tax purposes that increased the investors' net liquidity without
restricting the organization's operations. Specifically, investors would
benefit by investing in passthrough entities expected to report tax
losses.77 The tax losses would reduce the investors' total tax liability by
offsetting income derived from other sources. This theory blossoms in
tax shelter partnerships. Generally, tax shelters recognize for several
years tax losses that are often directly related to noncash tax benefits
76. The manager's externalization of the investors' financing problems may not show callous
disregard for the investors. In fact, it is difficult to know or to adjust for every investors' personal
finances. The more investors in the organization, the more futile would be the manager's efforts
to accommodate each investor.
77. Limitations on losses, especially on passive losses, reduce the cumulative benefit of loss
investments; but passive loss rules have not foreclosed completely the opportunities to utilize the
passive activity losses. See I.R.C. § 469 (West 1992).
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such as cost recovery deductions, nonrealization of capital appreciation,
and tax credits.78 The business activity cannot benefit from the losses
and credits because usually the activity has no income or tax liability
currently or in prior years and the manager does not anticipate any in the
near future. Consequently, the manager is less likely to want the tax
attributes for use in the activity and is willing to pass the tax losses
through to the investors. The lack of conflict between the manager and
the investors minimizes the agency costs of the relationship.
Some agency costs still remain. The manager's disposition deci-
sions still may create a conflict between the manager and the outside
investors.79 These disposition conflicts usually occur near the end of
most tax shelter partnerships, however, because the traditional tax shel-
ter is an investment partnership owning one dominant asset. The major
disposition decision is the disposition of the asset, which often results in
taxable gains.8" For most investment tax shelters, though, the manager
will distribute cash soon after disposing of the dominant asset, thereby
minimizing any distribution conflicts over the cash needed to pay the
resulting tax liability.
This second liquidity corollary operates in the start-up stage of
businesses as well. Investors would prefer passthrough treatment during
the accounting loss periods. Because the losses create tax refunds or
reductions in tax liability for the investors and the business cannot
receive the refunds since no taxes have been paid, the parties can reduce
total taxes by the adopting passthrough treatment. Once the business
activity records taxable profits, the agency cost analysis would predict
that investors would favor taxing the entity. At this stage, the managers
would reduce agency costs by shifting to an entity-assessed tax
classification.
E. Guidelines for Entity and Passthrough Taxation
1. GUIDELINES WHEN MANAGERS OWN MOST OF THE. INTERESTS IN
THE FIRM
Under an agency cost analysis, most business organizations in
which all the investors are managers of the business should be pass-
through entities. Although managers who are investors must make deci-
78. 2 WILLIAM S. McKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS
18.01 (2d ed. 1980).
79. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
80. The gains could exceed the money received on disposition. For example, many
investment tax shelters utilize debt to finance the purchase of a depreciable asset, and at point of
sale the basis of the asset is less than the outstanding balance of any indebtedness. Frequently, the
investors receive enough cash to satisfy any tax liability resulting from the disposition.
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sions that either favor the business or favor the manager's other
activities, the decision-makers are the same ones who bear the burden or
enjoy the benefit. The managers, knowing they must bear the tax conse-
quences, will control dispositions and, more critically, will control dis-
tributions to minimize the costs to themselves as investors. Thus, they
are more likely to make distributions if they need to pay taxes, or they
will expend personal assets to pay the taxes if the financing costs are
less than the increased benefit of utilizing the assets in the business.
Unfortunately, agency costs arise any time at least two persons are
affected by one decision or activity.8 Managers in many organizations
may be in different tax or economic situations and consequently disagree
over firm policies and transactions because of these tax differences.
Therefore, they may choose entity taxation to reduce the agency costs.
Managers should consider allowing some leeway to choose entity taxa-
tion to reduce conflicts among themselves.
If Congress imposes a mandatory classification on these organiza-
tions, passthrough treatment seems the better classification. Managers
would have input into the firm's disposition and distribution decisions.
A manager may be out-voted or for other reasons the firm's actual trans-
actions may be contrary to a manager's preferences, but the manager has
input into the decision. This may be enough for Congress to find that
passthrough taxation does not cause an unreasonable hardship on a man-
ager. Moreover, conflicts among managers may not be severe enough to
offset the costs of entity taxation. Since managers usually receive com-
pensation for services rendered to the business, managers should favor
the success of the business as providing both wages and return on capi-
tal. Moreover, the limited number of managers in an organization and
the interaction among managers creates an environment of flexibility
and cooperation to work out problems (although this would be small
consolation for an investor-manager who faced financial hardships with
no consideration from the other managers).
Current law, which allows Subchapter S corporation elections, may
have set a standard of compromise that would work satisfactorily even if
the entity classification guidelines change. The Subchapter S corpora-
tion election allows passthrough taxation for certain corporations with
thirty-five or fewer shareholders.82 Another statutory provision in effect
between 1954 and 1966 permitted some partnerships with fifty or fewer
partners to elect entity taxation if capital was a material income-produc-
81. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 6, at 309. Jensen and Meckling observe that even co-
authoring a paper creates agency costs. Id.
82. I.R.C. §§ 1361-1368 (West 1992).
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ing factor in the partnership.83 These compromises offer elective treat-
ment to organizations in which the managers, or the managers and
investors, will favor entity taxation in some instances and passthrough
taxation in others. Once the number of investors and managers exceeds
a certain number, Congress could indicate that the quantity of persons
was so great that agency costs in capital-intensive firms could be
reduced only by entity taxation.
A compromise zone where investors and managers can elect entity
taxation or passthrough taxation helps to resolve another sticky problem.
In most organizations some investors participate in the business while
other investors are passive investors who put up capital but do not par-
ticipate in the business. Clearly, in a mandatory classification system,
the presence of a solitary passive investor owning a one percent profits
interest will not cause entity taxation, nor will one investor owning a
small percentage who manages the business justify mandatory pass-
through taxation on all investors. The determinative standard should be
the relative profits interests held by participating investors and passive
investors rather than the number of active investors and passive
investors.84
83. I.R.C. § 1361 (1964), repealed by Pub. L. No.89-389, § 4(b)(1), 80 Stat. 116 (1966). The
provision was seldom used and little interest has been shown in re-enacting it. See BORIS I.
BrrrKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 2.12 (4th ed. 1979).
84. The policy choice is what profits percentage managers must own before the law mandates
equity taxation or passthrough taxation. As an upper limit, 80% ownership by the participating
investors should mandate passthrough treatment in all cases. The Tax Code often uses 80% as the
equivalent of complete ownership or control. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 165(g), 368(c), 1033(a)(2)(E),
1563(a) (West 1992).
Just as legitimately, Congress could dictate a lower upper limit of 50% profits ownership by
the participating investors to permit passthrough taxation. The lower limit for electing entity
taxation should be set at 20%. Cf STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION,
94TH CONG., IST SESS., TAX SHELTERS: USE OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS, ETC. 4 (Comm. Print
1975) (absence of centralization of management required if general partners own more than 20%
of a limited partnership's capital). Requiring at least a 20% profits interest by active investors
before the organization can elect not to be taxed as an entity means that the passive investors own
less than the 80% profits interest normally constituting complete ownership or control.
The Treasury has indicated that it might accept a 1% rate in certain cases. See Rev. Proc. 74-
17, 1974-1 C.B. 438. The revenue procedure sets out a requirement that general partners must
share in all tax attributes of the business. However, nothing in the revenue procedure indicates
that a maximum 1% interest in all attributes would pass review.
The problem of entity classification when some investors participate in the business
operations and others do not is discussed more fully in Joseph A. Snoe, Entity Classification
Under the Internal Revenue Code: A Proposal to Replace the Resemblance Model, 15 J. CORP. L.
647, 679-86 (1990).
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2. GUIDELINES WHEN LABORERS OWN MOST OF THE INTERESTS IN THE
FIRM
Agency cost analysis would treat labor-intensive businesses (those
in which capital is not a material income-producing factor) as pass-
through entities if investors labored in the business, whether or not the
investors were managers. 85 In contrast, investors' laboring in capital-
intensive businesses (those in which capital is a material income-produc-
ing factor) generally would not warrant passthrough treatment.8 6 Labor-
ers do not make disposition and distribution decisions. Investors in
labor-intensive businesses, however, do not experience the agency con-
flicts associated with capital-intensive businesses. The main distinction
is that labor-intensive businesses do not need to retain significant
amounts of cash to purchase assets. Distributions to investors, therefore,
approximate income. Hence the conflict that might arise from managers
retaining assets in the business, requiring the investors to turn to other
sources for funding the tax liability are minimized. Financing costs are
reduced or eliminated, since distributions approximate taxable income.
Organizations of doctors, lawyers, engineers, architects, accountants,
actuaries, actors, musicians, and consultants87 should be taxed as con-
duits.88 Logically, passthrough treatment should extend beyond organi-
zations of the learned professions to all service organizations, such as
house-cleaners, repair personnel, painters, or telephone solicitors.89
As the business becomes more capital-intensive, agency costs asso-
ciated with passthrough taxation increase. Managers increasingly will
want to retain cash to service asset acquisition indebtedness or to expand
plant and equipment. Once enough profits come from capital, managers
will make decisions without considering the tax effect on nonmanage-
ment investors, including laborer investors. At some point the full pano-
ply of agency costs come into play, and entity taxation becomes the
preferred tax treatment. The investors who labor in the business then
85. Snoe, supra note 84, at 675-76.
86. Id.
87. See I.R.C. § 448(d)(2)(A) (West 1992) (defining "qualified personal service
corporation").
88. Prior to 1921 investors in certain personal service corporations were taxed directly. See,
e.g., Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 254, § 218(e), 40 Stat. 1057, 1070 (1919), repealed by
Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 98, § 1400, 42 Stat. 227, 320 (1921). Congress has been
reluctant to mandate conduit treatment for professional service organizations since then, but
several Code sections indicate that personal service corporations are to be taxed differently than
other corporations. E.g., I.R.C. § 11 (b) (West 1992) (personal service corporations not eligible for
graduated tax rates); I.R.C. § 448(b) (West 1992) (qualified personal service corporations not
subject to prohibition against cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting).
89. Passthrough taxation of personal service organizations is discussed in Snoe, supra note
84, at 677-79, 685-86.
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more closely resemble passive investors who happen to be employees
and have insufficient input in conflict-creating decisions.90
3. GUIDELINES FOR PASSIVE INVESTMENTS
Passive investments derive income from rents, dividends, interest,
or increases in market value of the underlying assets.9' Agency costs
may arise if the investors, or at least those holding a significant share of
the organization, are not managers of the organization. But this will not
be true in all cases. In many cases the managers serve little more than
administrative functions or must give the investors the opportunity to
receive distributions. The conflict over cash to finance tax liability is
not an issue in these entities, and thus passthrough taxation is preferable.
Three organizations under current law-regulated investment com-
panies (RICs),92 real estate investment trusts (REITs),93 and real estate
mortgage investment conduits (REMICs) 9 -exemplify prototypical
passthrough organizations. Each of the three organizations must engage
predominantly in passive investments.95 The agency conflict is negated
because the three organizations must make distributions well above the
amounts needed to finance any tax liability resulting from passthrough
treatment. 96 The conflict is minimized further for RICs and REITs
because investors recognize income only to the extent of dividends
90. For a more detailed discussion of entity classification of capital-intensive organizations
under the wealth enhancement approach, see Snoe, supra note 84, at 685-86.
91. HOWARD E. ABRAMS & RICHARD L. DOERNBERG, FEDERAL CORPORATE TAXATION 243
(1987).
92. I.R.C. §§ 851-855, 860 (West 1992). Regulated investment companies are commonly
known as mutual funds. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONo., 2D SESS.,
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984
134 (Comm. Print 1985).
93. I.R.C. § 856-860 (West 1992).
94. I.R.C. § 860A-860G (West 1992).
95. I.R.C. § 851(b)(2) (West 1992) (at least 90% of RIC's gross income must be dividends,
interest, payments with respect to securities loans, and gains from sale or other disposition of
stock, securities, or foreign currencies); I.R.C. § 856(c) (West 1992) (95% of REIT's gross
income must be dividends, interest, rents from real property, gain from sale or other disposition of
stock, securities, and real property (other than property held for sale to customers in ordinary
course of business), abatements and refunds of taxes on real property, income and gain from
foreclosure property, and amounts received as consideration to make loans or to purchase or lease
real property, or gains from sale of real property held for at least four years and meeting certain
other requirements); I.R.C. § 860D(4) (West 1992) (substantially all of REMIC's assets must
consist of qualified mortgages and permitted investments).
96. I.R.C. § 852(a)(1) (West 1992) (RIC must pay dividends (as defined in § 561) equal to or
in excess of 90% of taxable income and 90% of tax-exempt income); I.R.C. § 857(a)(1) (West
1992) (REIT must pay dividends (as defined in § 561) equal to or in excess of 95% of taxable
income, excluding capital gains and 95% of excess gain from sale of foreclosure property over the
tax on the gain, minus "any excess noncash income" as defined in the Code); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.860G-2(g)(iii) (1992) (REMIC can invest excess cash received from qualified mortgages for a
maximum of thirteen months before distributing the money to holders of interests).
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received.97 The entity pays the tax on retained income.98 The agency
costs are minimized for REMICs since the Code not only limits the
REMIC to certain assets but also requires most assets to be acquired at
the beginning of the organization. 99
Ordinary trusts are treated similarly."° Ordinary trusts are limited
to passive investments.' 0' The beneficiary is taxed only on amounts that
are actually distributed or are required to be distributed to him.' The
trustee is liable for the tax on undistributed profits.'0 3 Under regula-
tions, the trust does not qualify as an ordinary trust if the trustee has a
power to buy, sell, and substitute securities since the trust then profits
from the rise and fall of securities and is, therefore, a business." Thus,
for passive or ordinary trusts, the trustee has limited discretionary pow-
ers. This negates the potential for conflict over the amount and inci-
dence of tax and any cash flow to pay any resulting tax liability between
the manager and the beneficiaries.
Despite the stringent rules limiting the trustee's discretion, the
Code implicitly accepts that trustees in some trusts will accumulate
income and invest the accumulated profits. 5 Even then the income for
tax purposes flows through to the beneficiaries only to the extent the
beneficiary is entitled to receive distributions or otherwise actually
receives distributions.' 0 6 The grantor trust rules seem to follow the gen-
eral rule by taxing any grantor who has certain powers over or rights in a
trust.'07 Generally, the provisions require the grantor to control
distributions.0 8
97. I.R.C. §§ 852(b)(2)(D), 857(b)(2)(B) (West 1992). A regulated investment company is
considered as paying dividends by actual distribution. See Treas. Reg. § 1.561-1(a) (as amended
in 1962). Additionally, the investment company is entitled to a dividends paid deduction if an
amount allocated to an investor is credited to a share increase on the company's books or the
investor has the unqualified right to withdraw his funds instead of reinvesting in the entity. Treas.
Reg. § 1.561-2(a)(4)-(6) (1960); Rev. Rul. 72-410, 1972-2 C.B. 412; Rev. Rul. 65-89, 1965-1
C.B. 265. The investment company can elect to treat certain dividends as paid in the current year
even if paid in the next year. I.R.C. § 855 (West 1992). Similar rules apply to REITs. See I.R.C.
§§ 857(b)(2)(B), 858 (West 1992).
98. I.R.C. §§ 852(b), 857(b) (West 1992).
99. I.R.C. §§ 860D(a)(4), 860G(a)(3) (West 1992).
100. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(a) (as amended in 1986).
101. Id.
102. I.R.C. §§ 651, 661 (West 1992).
103. I.R.C. § 641(a)(4) (West 1992).
104. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(c) (as amended in 1986); T.D. 8080, 1986-1 C.B. 371, 371.
105. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 662 (West 1992).
106. Id.
107. See I.R.C. §§ 671-677 (West 1992).
108. These powers to control distributions include the power to control beneficial enjoyment,
the power to purchase any property from trust or to borrow from the trust at less than full and
adequate consideration, and the power to revoke the trust. I.R.C. § 674-676 (West 1992).
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Although doggedly insuring that the tax laws do not create agency
costs, the Code does not offer enough options for investors in organiza-
tions that engage in passive investments to be taxed directly. For exam-
ple, many investors in investment trusts should be taxed directly. The
manager's ability to buy and sell securities should not preclude conduit
treatment, especially if the investors have the right to demand distribu-
tions. Likewise, the manager should not be as limited as the RIC, REIT,
and REMIC provisions require for passthrough treatment.
Many personal holding companies, as another example, should be
passthrough entities. °9 For a corporation to be taxed as a personal hold-
ing company, five or fewer investors must own more than fifty percent
of the corporation's outstanding stock and at least sixty percent of the
corporation's gross income must be derived from passive investments,
from personal service contracts, and from compensation for the use of
tangible property by shareholders who own twenty-five percent of the
outstanding stock of the corporation.110 Instead of taxing this income
directly to the shareholders, present law imposes an additional tax on the
corporation above the corporation's normal tax."' The corporation can
avoid the personal holding company tax, but not the normal corporation
tax, by paying dividends to shareholders." 2 Investors can help the cor-
poration avoid the double tax by consenting to be taxed as though divi-
dends were paid to them.' ' 3  Consequently, the investors can elect
conduit treatment for the second tax, but they cannot avoid the double
tax.
Investors wanting to avoid the tax penalties of the personal holding
company and the restrictive contours of trusts, RICs, REITs, and
REMICs can hold investments in partnerships, Subchapter S corpora-
tions, or limited liability companies, which all provide for passthrough
taxation if the investors plan for it." 4 Whether the investors choose
109. See Snoe, supra note 84, at 670-72. Before 1922, the tax laws required shareholders in
personal holding companies to report the corporation's income directly. See Samuel Joyce
Sherman, Taxation of Corporations Used to Avoid Taxes Upon Shareholders - Part 1, 13 TAX
MAG. 19, 20-21 (1935). The change to taxing the corporation occurred when Congress questioned
whether Congress constitutionally could tax shareholders on the corporation's income. See Harry
J. Rudick, Section 102 and Personal Holding Company Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code,
49 YALE L.J. 171, 218 (1939). These doubts have been dispelled, but the tax laws continue to tax
the corporation. See Helvering v. National Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282, 288-89 (1938).
110. I.R.C. § 543(a) (West 1992).
111. I.R.C. § 541 (West 1992) (the current rate is 28%).
112. I.R.C. § 545(a) (West 1992).
113. I.R.C. §§ 561(a)(2), 565 (West 1992).
114. The investors must act cautiously to avoid the organization's taxation as a corporation.
Publicly traded partnerships, for example, are taxed as corporations. I.R.C. § 7704 (West 1992).
Limited liability companies, by having limited liability, possess one of the four characteristics
needed for classification as an association taxed as a corporation. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2
1993]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1
passthrough taxation or entity taxation depends on which manner of tax-
ation makes the most economic sense to them. The investors must bal-
ance any tax premium payable for entity taxation against the agency
costs of passthrough taxation."
15
Factors favoring entity taxation are managerial discretion on dispo-
sition decisions, the need to retain cash in the business, and the inves-
tors' need for cash from the business to pay any individual taxes
accruing from passthrough taxation. On the other hand, factors favoring
passthrough taxation include the likelihood of the manager's paying out
substantially all profits to investors, the investment's reporting account-
ing losses for tax purposes, 1 6 and the investors' willingness to pay tax
while the manager reinvests profits in the business. 17 Passthrough taxa-
tion not only avoids any tax premium Congress may assess for the privi-
lege of entity taxation, it also taxes each investor at his individual rate.
If the same amount of taxes will be assessed under entity taxation as
under passthrough taxation, entity taxation favors taxpayers whose indi-
vidual tax rate is higher than the entity rate at the expense of investors
whose rate is lower than the entity rate.
III. THE ARGUMENT FOR A DEFERRED DISTRIBuTIONs TAX
Part II addressed the question of whether an entity tax was ever
(as amended in 1983). Subchapter S corporations are limited to thirty-five shareholders and one
class of stock, among other restrictions. I.R.C. § 1361(b) (West 1992).
115. See Ribstein, supra note 45, at 457.
116. Although beyond the scope of this article, whether losses should pass through to investors
remains an issue. In RICs, REITs, and trusts, only profits pass through, while in Subchapter S
corporations and partnerships, profits and losses both pass through to investors. I.R.C.
§§ 852(b)(2)(D), 857(b)(2)(B), 702(a), 1366(a) (West 1992). The tax laws today are
embarrassingly inconsistent. Certainly, the emphasis on individual taxpayer liability provides a
persuasive argument that losses should pass through to individual investors, who then would apply
their own individual limitations. If the losses are limited by activity, then no loss passthrough
seems the better option.
The passive loss rules illustrate the inconsistency. First, passive losses are limited to passive
gains. I.R.C. § 469(d)(1) (West 1992). Yet, the gains may come from any passive activity. Id.
However, losses from a publicly traded partnership can only be offset against profits of that
particular partnership. Id. § 469(k). A recent Treasury report indicates a preference for no loss
passthrough. DEP'T oF TREASURY, supra note 3, at 30.
As discussed supra text accompanying notes 77-80, managers and investors favor loss
passthroughs when the activity does not anticipate any taxable income in near future. On the other
hand, denying loss passthroughs should not create agency costs since the manager may have made
the disposition decisions based on economic analysis. In fact, a good argument can be made that
loss passthrough could create a conflict for the manager if she disposes of an asset solely to pass
losses through to investors when the manager otherwise would not want to dispose of or acquire
an asset if the passthrough were of credits. Finally, a conflict could occur at the point when an
organization changes from passthrough to entity tax if the entity currently reports losses but
anticipates profits in the near future.
117. See Kanda & Levmore, supra note 4, at 239.
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merited and concluded under an agency cost analysis that the entity tax
is justified in many situations because it reduces the agency costs associ-
ated with the taxing of business income. This Part addresses the issue of
whether a double tax system ever is merited.
As an initial observation, investors would not elect a double tax
system if the tax cost significantly exceeded the benefits of the sys-
tem.' 18 If more than a reasonable premium is charged, the investors will
elect passthrough taxation, if possible." 9 If investors in limited liability
companies continue to have a choice of entity taxation or passthrough
taxation, 20 for example, the investors will begin using limited liability
companies to duplicate much of the nontax corporate attributes and still
opt for conduit taxation.12 1 If, on the other hand, the premium for entity
taxation or the double tax is not too great, the preceding discussion indi-
cates that many investors will elect entity taxation. This Part suggests
that many investors would choose double taxation if the tax costs did not
outweigh the benefits. The agency cost analysis here is more complex
because the government should accept alternatives only if the Treasury
collects at least as much tax under any entity tax or double tax as it
would under a passthrough system.
A. The Treasury's Integration Proposals
The Treasury and many commentators have put forth corporation-
shareholder integration proposals to eliminate the double tax. Sugges-
tions include taxing only the entity and not taxing the investors on distri-
butions 22 or taxing the entity initially and then providing some tax
accommodation either to the entity or to its investors on distributions to
the investors. This subpart evaluates the Treasury's integration propos-
als using an agency cost analysis. Subpart B develops an approach not
discussed by the Treasury whereby entities would pay a deferred distri-
butions tax akin to an interest charge on undistributed profits.
1. DIVIDEND EXCLUSION PLAN
In a 1992 Report, 2 3 the Treasury, after studying several integration
118. See id. at 241.
119. Congress or the Treasury through regulations may mandate entity, two-tier, or
passthrough taxation, without giving investors the election. Even if investors can elect, the cost of
election may deter making the election. For example, an entity subject to the corporate tax must
pay a substantial tax on a deemed liquidation to change to passthrough taxation or be subject to
the restrictive S corporation provisions. See Brrr R & EUSTICE, supra note 16, 11.03 at 11-3;
I.R.C. §§ 1361, 1374 (West 1992).
120. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
121. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 45, at 473-74.
122. See McLure, supra note 2, at 552-53.
123. DEP'T OF TREASURY, supra note 3.
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prototypes, favored the dividend exclusion plan because of its simplic-
ity124 Under this plan the entity pays a tax and investors receive distri-
butions tax-free." 5 The Treasury's main concern is that the model
creates an incentive for entities to distribute rather than to retain
earnings. 126
Agency cost problems argue against this plan. No immediate dis-
position conflicts occur because the entity, and not the investors, pays
the tax. However, there is a distribution conflict, which itself may lead
to disposition conflicts. The distribution conflict occurs because inves-
tors do not pay taxes on distributions. Unless the return achieved on the
retained earnings is greater than the return on any other like-risk invest-
ment, the investor might seek a complete distribution of taxed profits.
1 27
Thus, an investor desiring cash would prefer tax-free distributions to
selling his interest in the entity. On a sale of his interest, the investor not
only no longer owns his investment in the entity, he also must face a
potential taxable gain in addition to transaction costs incurred on the
sale. For the same reasons, the investor would prefer tax-free distribu-
tions to selling his other assets.
The manager, on the other hand, may be more reluctant to commit
taxed profits to long-term investments or durable goods for fear of
investor demands for distributions. Unfortunately, unlike financial insti-
tutions or mutual funds, most business managers maintain relatively low
cash reserves or cash equivalents.' 28  The tax on the investors' sales of
124. Id. at 17. The most troublesome long-term problem that the Treasury identified was
taxation of gains from the sale of stock. Id. at 18. The Treasury's suggested resolution would
allow dividend reinvestment plans (DRIPs), through which entities could declare deemed
dividends and treat the deemed dividends as reinvested in the entity. Id. at 82-83. Giving the
investors an opportunity to receive stock as dividends implies that the investors will have an
option to receive cash instead of stock. Cf. I.R.C. § 305(b) (West 1992) (distribution of stock is
considered dividend distribution only if shareholders can elect to receive stock or property). The
possibility that a large number of investors will prefer distributions exists because they suffer no
negative tax consequences for receiving the distributions.
125, DEP'T OF TREASURY, supra note 3, at 17. A related form is the comprehensive business
income tax (CBIT) that extends the dividend exclusion model to interest payments, thereby
treating interest and dividends alike. Id. at 39-40.
126. Id. at 27.
127. The Treasury model would tax the investors on any distributions out of preference
income, including income the entity received tax-free. Id. at 19. The formula set out to identify
"excludable distributions account" amounts divided the tax paid by .34 (the highest entity rate at
the time of the study) and then reduced that number by the amount of any tax paid. Id. The
excludable dividends received by the entity are then added to the resulting figure. Id. Thus, none
of the tax reduction benefits an entity enjoys passes through to the investors. For example, a tax
reduction due to a tax credit or a graduated rate results in some future distribution being taxed to
the investors.
128. 1 ARTHUR STONE DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 698 (5th ed. 1953).
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the investment but not on distributions from the firm places a premium
on a return from distributions.
In addition to the distribution conflicts, the intensified agency costs
would create additional disposition conflicts over the mix between long-
term investments and liquidity the manager maintains. Some investors
want liquidity to maximize distributions, but others prefer the highest
return on all assets. Moreover, a manager may make suboptimal dispo-
sition decisions either to satisfy distribution demands or to bolster
accounting profits. Additionally, the manager may delay selling an asset
for fear she could not use the sales proceeds to replace the asset because
investors might demand distributions equal to any taxed profits.
The 1992 Treasury Report indicates that the Treasury does not
expect wholesale distributions but that it does anticipate a ten to twenty
percent increase in the amount of after-tax distributions if an integration
plan is implemented.' 29 The Treasury Report argues that encouraging
dividend distributions promotes economic efficiency. 130 The report sug-
gests that the swing from favoring retention of profits to favoring distri-
butions will move the balance closer to an economy undistorted by tax
laws.13 ' If the Treasury is correct, the shift in the equilibrium is com-
mendable. If incorrect, it would seem to be a better policy to err slightly
in favor of retained profits for use in the business. Unfortunately, the
dividend exclusion prototype as proposed would encourage distributions
in excess of the undistorted optimal efficiency amount.
13 2
Another criticism of the dividend exclusion model is that the single
tax on the entity and none 33 on the investors benefits high-bracket tax-
payers at the expense of low-bracket taxpayers.1 34 This is not a concern
when flat individual rates apply, but if Congress returns to progressive
rates, lower bracket investors should opt for investments taxed to the
individual investor rather than at the entity level.
129. See DEP'T OF TREASURY, supra note 3, at 124-25. According to the Treasury,
corporations currently pay out 72.8% of after-tax real profits (taking into consideration inflation)
and a lower 42.8% of after-tax nominal profits. Id. at 125. The Treasury expects the distribution
to rise to 80% or 85.9% of after-tax real profits or up to 46.4% of after-tax nominal profits under
integration prototypes.
130. Id. at 116-18, 124-25.
131. Id. at 124-25.
132. Id. at 125 (Table 13.2).
133. Investors would recognize income in some situations. See supra note 127.
134. See McLure, supra note 2, at 552. Professor Warren, as reporter for an A.L.I. study,
rejected this alternative specifically because the dividend exclusion plan would preclude the
application of graduated rates to individual investors. Warren, supra note 3, at 49.
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2. IMPUTATION CREDIT SYSTEM
The 1992 Treasury Report rejects an imputation credit system.' 35
In direct contrast, Professor Warren, as Reporter of a subsequent Ameri-
can Law Institute study, favored the imputation credit system. 1 36 Under
the imputation credit system, the entity initially pays a tax. An investor
receiving a distribution treated as a dividend would gross up the distri-
bution by the amount of the tax attributed to the distribution. The gross-
up portion would be allowed as a credit against the investor's individual
taxes. 137 The Treasury Report lists separate options allowing investors
to use the credit to shelter tax liability from other income or to limit the
credit roughly to the tax liability from the dividend distributions.' 38
The same general analysis applied to the dividend exclusion plan
applies to an imputation credit system. The imputation credit system,
however, resolves the inequitable shift of tax incidence from high
bracket investors to low bracket investors that plagues the dividend
exclusion prototype. On the other hand, it intensifies the conflict over
distributions. Investors with higher personal rates than the tax credit rate
on distributions should favor leaving the profits in the business, while
investors whose personal rates are lower than the credit rate should favor
distributions. Under either of the proposed imputation credit systems,
most investors probably will favor distributions since the passthrough
credits likely will exceed any tax liability attributed to the distribution
and, for many if not most investors, the excess credits reduce tax liabil-
ity from other income. As investors demand more distributions, manag-
ers faced with both paying the initial entity tax and making distributions
will incur the same type of agency costs discussed under the dividend
exclusion plan; but these costs will be even more intense.
3. SHAREHOLDER ALLOCATION PROTOTYPE
The 1992 Treasury Report submits but does not recommend a
model it calls the "shareholder allocation prototype" that taxes the entity
and at the same time passes the net income (but not net losses) and a
credit for taxes paid by the entity through to the investors. 139 The inves-
tors with marginal rates less than the entity's effective rate could offset
the tax against other income. 40 One benefit of the shareholder alloca-
135. DEP'T OF TREASURY, supra note 3, at 93.
136. Warren, supra note 3, at 47-57.
137. DEP'T OF TREASURY, supra note 3, at 93.
138. Id. at 95. The Treasury's preferred approach would be to calculate the credit at the
individual's maximum rate (currently 39.6%) instead of the entity's maximum rate (34% or 35%).
Id.
139. Id. at 27-37.
140. Id. at 27-28.
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tion prototype is that taxing the investors at their individual rates elimi-
nates the inequitable shifting of tax liability associated with the dividend
exclusion model.
Unstated in the proposal but apparent nonetheless is the fact that
investors with marginal rates higher than the entity's effective rate must
pay the excess taxes from the investors' other assets. The agency costs
analysis for passthrough taxation discussed earlier applies, although to a
lesser extent than if the entity served as a passthrough and did not pay
any tax. Investors may demand distributions to pay any excess tax,' 4 '
and in some cases the manager may accelerate or defer disposing of
assets based on her personal tax situation.' 42 Setting the entity tax rates
high enough to guarantee that only a few if any investors would need
cash from other assets requires entities to pay more to the Treasury, with
higher than needed payments benefiting investors rather than being
refunded to the entities. Entities may reduce distributions to offset the
extra tax payments, but the shareholder allocation prototype could cause
a cash drain on many entities.
4. DIVIDEND DEDUCTION PROTOTYPE
The dividend deduction prototype permits the entity to deduct from
income all or some portion of distributions paid to investors.1 43 The
dividend deduction prototype equates equity with debt treatment. The
proposal authorizes deductions for dividends just as entities currently
deduct interest. 44 The rush to distributions tracks the tax rate differen-
tial between the entity and the investors. If the investor's rate is less
than the entity's for the year, the investor would prefer a distribution.
Conversely, if the investor's rate is higher than the entity's rate, the
investor would be satisfied to leave his share of the profits in the entity.
A conflict occurs when the entity's tax rate is greater than some inves-
tors and less than others. What choice a manager would prefer would
depend on her personal situation. In some instances a manager may
delay disposition activities to keep the entity's taxable income and, more
critically, its tax rate low to justify retaining profits in the business.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 60-65.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 39-43.
143. DEP'T OF TREASURY, supra note 3, at 107. The 1992 Treasury Report cites earlier studies
recommending a 50% dividends paid deduction and a 10% deduction. Id.
144. Id. The earlier proposals authorizing only a portion of the dividends as deductions
maintained a distinction between dividends and interest. See id. at 125 (Table 132). The Treasury
favors another prototype that equates dividends and interest by denying a deduction for interest
payments. See supra note 125; DEP'T OF TREASURY, supra note 3, at 39-60 (discussing
comprehensive business income tax prototypes (CBIT)).
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B. A Deferred Distributions Tax
1. ONE OPTION: A DEFERRED DISTRIBUTIONS TAX ON AN ENTITY'S
ANNUAL INCOME
Taxing neither the entity nor the investors on the income from busi-
ness operations avoids conflicts between managers and the investors.
Taxing only the investors and then only when they receive distributions
serves as a viable alternative. Thus, if the entity pays no tax at all and
the investors pay a tax only on received distributions, the investors never
absorb the tax costs of the manager's nonpecuniary benefits.145 More-
over, because the investors can use the distributed proceeds to pay any
taxed owed, the financing costs and conflicts disappear. 46
Taxing investors on distributions and not taxing the entity encour-
ages the manager to reinvest all profits in the organization. Distributions
will not be economically efficient for the investors until the return the
manager can get on untaxed profits is less than the return investors can
receive on after-tax distributions. For a long while, investors will favor
the manager retaining all profits. At some point, those investors in the
lower tax brackets will favor distributions over retention. At this point
the tax rates result in a conflict between the manager and some inves-
tors. The manager as investor may want to distribute money to the
investors or retain money in the firm depending on her personal tax
bracket. The manager as manager and some investors may want to
retain capital in the business no matter how small the return.
The Treasury prefers distributions because they result in higher tax
collection. To protect the fisc, Congress could (and does) charge an
undistributed or accumulated earnings tax or penalty for unreasonable
accumulations of profits.147 To eliminate all conflicts as to whether the
manager should retain profits or make distributions, Congress could
impose a steep tax penalty. If Congress imposes a draconian penalty,
then the penalty rationally should be limited to profits retained to avoid
the income tax, with retained profits legitimately reinvested in the busi-
ness exempt from the penalty.
14 8
While the accumulated earnings tax significantly reduces the con-
flict between the manager and the investors and also accommodates the
Treasury's objective of preventing undue tax deferral, a second problem
145. See supra text accompanying notes 48-59. Conflicts unrelated to tax issues remain.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 61-75.
147. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 531-537 (West 1992).
148. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 533, 537 (West 1992) (evidence of purpose to avoid income tax and
reasonable needs of the business, respectively); see BrrrIKER & EUSTICE, supra note 16, 8.01, at
8-2 to 8-30 (discussing the forbidden tax avoidance purpose of accumulating income and the
reasonable needs of the business).
[Vol. 48:1
DEFERRED DISTRIBUTIONS TAX
still pertains. This article assumes that the Treasury will collect the
same amount of money over time whether the firm is subject to an entity
tax or whether the firm is deemed a passthrough entity. Congress, there-
fore, must account for the time value of any deferred collection. Con-
gress should impose a higher rate on deferred income than on income
taxed to the investors in the year the business recognizes it.149 The
higher rate should reflect the time value of money associated with the
deferral period.
This complicates matters considerably. For example, to be precise
each entity could maintain schedules tracing profits earned but not dis-
tributed and would disclose to each investor the year the profits being
distributed were earned. °5 0  Each investor would then calculate an
accrued interest on the deferred tax liability attributable to the distribu-
tion. For example, an investor receiving a $1000 distribution of profits
attributable to a period ten years earlier first would determine his tax
attributable to the distribution-here using $396 for illustration' 5 '-and
then calculate the interest on the deferred payment.1 52 Using a ten per-
cent interest rate compounded annually, this hypothetical taxpayer
would owe an additional $638 for the deferral privilege for a total pay-
ment to the Treasury of $1028 on his $1000 distribution. 153 If the profits
had been earned fifteen years earlier, the additional payment at ten per-
cent would be $1259, for a total payment to the Treasury of $1655 on
his $1000 distribution. 
154
Congress could simplify the procedure by setting one rate for distri-
butions based on the average deferral period for distributions. Much
thought and research must go into determining this rate, but for discus-
sion purposes based on the previous paragraph we may assume it would
be between eighty and one hundred percent. Compared to the current
149. The rate, though higher than the current rates on the individual or the firm, may be lower
than the combined current individual and corporate rates.
150. Presumably profits would be distributed from the earliest years on a first-earned, first-
distributed basis. Some leeway exists here to allow, as an example, the distributions to come from
current year earnings before reaching back to the earlier time periods.
151. Several options are available for calculating the tax on the distribution. The example took
the simplest option of using the highest rate in the 1993 Act applicable to individual taxpayers and
assuming the investor was in the highest bracket. Another approach would have the taxpayer
determine his average tax rate for the taxable year. A more complex and possibly unwieldy
choice is to determine the individual's tax based on rates applicable when the firm first reported
the profits.
152. Cf. I.R.C. § 453(l)(3)(B) (West 1992) (outlining procedures for determining interest on
tax attributable to installment sales of timeshares and residential lots).
153. Even at a more modest 7.5% rate the additional payment would be $420, for a total
payment of $816. The fact that the shareholder owes more to the Treasury than she receives from
the corporation indicates the magnitude of the deferral benefit currently available to shareholders.
154. Using a more modest rate of 7.5%, the additional payment would be $776 for a total
payment of $1172 on the $1000 distribution.
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highest individual rate of 39.6% on other income, this special dividend
or distribution rate is astronomically high and would result in managers
only reluctantly authorizing distributions.
Acceptable alternatives can be fashioned. The most practical
approach would be to tax distributions at the investor's tax rate and work
backward to determine the tax the entity must pay. For example, assum-
ing the Treasury determines that the average time between earnings and
distribution is ten years, that a ten percent discount rate is appropriate,
and that the maximum rate on individuals is 39.6%, then the law could
assess the entity at a 24.5% rate and the individual at a 39.6% rate and
the tax would approximate the present value of immediate taxation in
the year the profits are first reported. 55 Despite the admitted generality
of the equations, 56 the entity tax is about two-thirds of the maximum
individual tax. While it may be coincidental, this relationship closely
resembles that in effect when the maximum rate on dividends was sev-
enty percent and the maximum rate on corporations was forty-six and
forty-eight percent.
This two-tier taxing system reduces some agency costs. First, the
entity would pay a tax, so the manager must make disposition decisions
taking tax into consideration. Second, investors would not pay any tax
on the firm's income until they receive distributions, thereby reducing
conflicts over distributions. Third, the investors would pay the same tax
rate as on other income, so they would not be prone to prefer distribu-
tions from the firm when other investments or personal needs required
capital. Fourth, the lower entity rate would encourage investors to favor
leaving profits in the organization until the return the manager gets from
capital after paying a 24.5% tax is less than the investors could get after
paying a 39.6% tax. This latter merit should placate managers who want
to retain capital and who want to avoid erratic demands for distributions.
Fifth, and although not a conflict between manager and investors but a
governmental concern nonetheless, the lower rate on the business would
leave liquid reserves in the business, which should aid the business
155. The tax on a $1000 distribution would be $396. The present value of $396 at a 10%
discount rate (discount factor of .386) is $153. Added to the $245 the entity would pay, the
present value is $398.
156. The numbers and estimates used are very rough and considerable refinement would be
necessary. For example, the calculation assumed $1000 profits and $1000 distributed. In
actuality, of $1000 profits only $800 remain to be distributed. Similarly, the calculations are
premised on the entity and the investors being in the highest tax bracket. Also, the assumption
that firms retain profits for ten to fifteen years may not be correct. See, e.g., supra notes 147-48
and accompanying text. Moreover, the rates have not considered at all the effect of capital gains




either to expand or stay solvent. 157 Since the cash is being reinvested in
the business and is not accessible to investors for personal use or for
passive investments, Congress could favor this two-tier tax on an eco-
nomic growth rationale.15 8
The tax scheme, however, is not precise. Setting the rates them-
selves assumes a constant period of deferral. Those organizations that
pay distributions before the assumed period cause their investors to pay
a higher than optimal tax. Likewise, those organizations that delay dis-
tributions well beyond the expected deferral time are able to provide
interest-free loans for their investors. Those investors who prefer capital
reinvestment and who do not need or desire distributions benefit by this
scheme. Disadvantaged by the scheme are those investors who depend
on regular distributions that approximate earnings.
On the other hand, the two-tier approach favors those industries in
which capital reinvestment is the norm. Capital-intensive businesses
benefit because these businesses reinvest profits to replace or expand
plant and equipment. The firms for which the entity tax is the most
appropriate, therefore, are precisely the ones in which the two-tier tax is
the most attractive. On the other hand, those firms where labor gener-
ates profits, especially where the investors are the labor, and substan-
tially all profits are distributed close to the time of their being earned are
those which agency cost analysis indicates should be taxed as pass-
throughs and which are penalized by a two-tier tax. t59 The two-tier tax,
therefore, gives investors in capital-intensive businesses an incentive to
select entity taxation and simultaneously discourages investors in per-
sonal services or labor-intensive businesses from entity taxation and
towards passthrough treatment.
Another deviation from the ideal is that the entity tax is spread
157. Businesses retaining excessive profits would be subject to an accumulated earnings tax.
See supra notes 147-48.
158. Although considered meritorious in the text, retaining profits in the firm favors high-
income or otherwise wealthy investors relative to low-income investors. Further, retaining profits
encourages firms to obtain capital internally rather than by going to capital markets. See McLure,
supra note 2, at 539. The first consideration, favoring wealthy investors at the expense of low-
income investors, is discussed at infra text accompanying note 160. The second consideration,
encouraging firms to obtain capital internally rather than going to capital markets, seems to be a
positive element. Seeking additional equity is an expensive proposition. While some investors
who want to invest in firms may be precluded from doing so, these investors can fund new
businesses needing the capital. The new firms themselves would benefit by the same tax rules.
159. A firm subject to the two-tier tax that distributes profits one year after reporting them for
tax purposes effectively has subjected the investors to an usurious 160% interest charge under the
tax system discussed in the text. For example, the $396 assessment against the investor plus the
$245 collected against the firm is effectively $245 nondeductible interest for the one-year deferral
when $39 to $40 would be paid to a lender for a one-year loan. See supra text accompanying note
155.
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equally among all investors. Thus, the income share allocable to an
investor in a high tax bracket is taxed at the same rate as the income
share to a low-bracket investor. Low-bracket taxpayers, therefore, pay a
proportionately higher tax than they normally would under a pure pass-
through system. A significant possibility exists that higher bracket tax-
payers pay a lesser tax than they would under pure passthrough,'" with
the lower-bracket taxpayers bearing the higher-bracket taxpayers' share.
The flatter the rate schedule, the less offensive the discrepancy. Under a
steeply progressive schedule where the marginal rates may register as
high as an absolute fifty percent difference, the manager's subjecting the
business to an entity tax itself may create conflicts between the manager
and the various investors.
To diminish any anxiety about the difference in tax rates between
high-bracket taxpayers and low-bracket taxpayers, whether under the
agency cost analysis or under a vertical equity analysis, the tax the entity
pays may be considered the deferral charge on the entity for retaining
profits rather than the tax itself. The tax itself would then be owed only
once, upon distribution to the investors, and based on the individual
investor's tax situation.
As long as the cost to retain profits is less than the cost of alterna-
tive sources of capital and the return on the profits is greater than the
cost of retaining them, the manager will pay the assessment to defer the
investors' reporting the income. The deferred distributions tax to the
manager, therefore, is an expense of doing business as any other busi-
ness interest expense would be.
161
Although potential vertical equity concerns between high-bracket
and low-bracket taxpayers apply here as well since the entity's payment
of the tax benefits each investor to a different degree, the concerns are
minimized somewhat and at any rate are no greater than under current
law or any proposed remediation. Initially, the investors would favor
the entity's manager paying the assessment since the investors would not
be obligated to finance the liability. As long as the return on the
retained capital exceeds the amount the investors would receive by
investing the profits after paying their individual taxes, they should be
content to allow the money to remain in the business.
The potential agency cost overshadowing the transactions is that
higher-rate investors benefit more by the entity paying the deferral
160. The rates could be set up to insure that taxpayers in the highest bracket pay the same
amount of tax under the two-tier system as they would under the passthrough system. Lower-
bracket taxpayers' share of total payments would be higher than they normally would be under a
passthrough system, but in many ways they benefit most by entity taxation rather than passthrough
taxation because they need cash from the distributions to pay any tax liability.
161. The deferred distributions tax should be a nondeductible expense.
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charge than do the lower-rate investors. This concern is offset some-
what because no investor is certain what bracket he will be in when he
ultimately is taxed on the distributions. Thus the optimistic possibility
exists that each investor will benefit from the arrangement. Second, the
rates are set for the average firm so that in any given firm the potential
exists that the investors all will benefit at the expense of investors in
other firms. Third, the wealth enhancement from the manager's using
the profits in the firm ideally results in greater profits for all investors
than immediate taxation would.
2. ANOTHER OPTION: A DEFERRED DISTRIBUTIONS TAX ON AN
ENTITY'S UNDISTRIBUTED PROFITS
A more precise application of the above principle would tax entities
annually on the actual amount of undistributed profits rather than man-
dating prepayment based on the estimated time until distribution. Under
this approach, a deferred distributions tax would be assessed annually on
accumulated undistributed profits. A firm that annually distributed cash
equal to profits would not be taxed. Those that retained multiple years'
profits would pay an assessment on the total undistributed profits.
Under this system, start-up firms would pay significantly less tax
than they would under the current two-tier regime since their undistrib-
uted earnings equals their income in the first year. For example, a firm
in its first year of operation that reports but does not distribute $100,000
profits is assessed $3960.162 In year two, this firm reports but does not
distribute $100,000 and pays $7920. Several years later, when the
undistributed profits are $5 million and it records a $1 million profit, the
firm's deferred distributions tax would be $237,600.
At some point, the deferred distributions tax could exceed the
entity's federal income tax liability under current law. Although more
study and better data is required to reach any legitimate conclusions,
financial data indicates that many well-established firms would pay
more in deferred distributions taxes than they currently do in income
taxes.
For example, Exxon Corporation paid $639 million in federal
income taxes in 1990 and $700 million in 1991.163 Assuming for illus-
trative purposes that Exxon's retained earnings accurately represent its
undistributed profits, the deferred distributions tax for 1990 would have
been about $1.4 billion (or more than twice its actual tax payment) and
162. ($100,000 profits) x (39.6% maximum individual rate) x (10% imputed interest rate) =
$3960.
163. ExXON CORP. 1991 ANNUAL REPORT F19 (1992).
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just over $1.4 billion in 1991 (about twice its actual payment).'6 IBM
would have paid a deferred distributions tax of just over $1 billion for
1990.165 This is $600 million more than the $379 million IBM paid in
federal income taxes in 1990.166 Because the deferred distributions tax
is a function of undistributed profits and not the taxable income for the
year, many firms with current losses still will be assessed. General
Motors, for example, which lost more than $2 billion in 1990, and nearly
$6 billion in 1991, would have paid a deferred distributions tax of $841
million in 1990 and $667 million in 1991.167 Other companies, such as
Safeway, Inc., paid income taxes in 1990 but would not have owed any
deferred distributions tax because they had no accumulated undistributed
profits.168  Still other well-established companies, such as Anheuser-
Busch Companies, Inc., would have paid less in deferred distributions
tax ($162 million) than they did in federal income taxes ($387
million).
169
Theoretically, investors should prefer the manager's retaining prof-
its in the firm until the return the manager can get on the retained profits
is less than the return the investor can get elsewhere after paying the
164. Federal income tax was calculated by combining current federal income tax and U.S. tax
on foreign operations. Id. Retained earnings after tax were $44,286,000,000 in 1990 and
$46,483,000,000 in 1991. Id. Retained earnings may not accurately represent undistributed
profits since tax accounting conventions differ in many respects from generally accepted
accounting principles. The deferred distributions tax concept must be studied further. For
example, one issue is the proper treatment of capital invested in subsidiaries. Only one deferred
distributions tax should apply. Therefore, Exxon should not pay a tax if the subsidiary pays the
charge for the same undistributed profits. It appears, however, that Exxon's consolidated financial
statements already have netted out this complication. Id.
Deferred distribution taxes are calculated assuming the undistributed profits would be taxed
at the highest individual rate, 31% in 1990 and 1991. A hypothetical tax liability is calculated at
the 31% rate, which assumes all undistributed profits are distributed. The deferred distributions
tax rate-10% is used in text-is applied to the resulting hypothetical tax liability to determine
the deferred distributions tax. Under the higher 39.6% tax rate, the deferred distributions tax
would increase to $1.75 billion in 1990 and $1.8 billion in 1991.
165. MOODY'S INVESTOR SERVICE, INC., MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 329 (1991). IBM's
retained earnings for 1990 were $33,234,000,000. The calculation in the text assumes the 31%
maximum individual rate in effect in 1990.
166. INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 42 (1992).
The calculation in the text assumes the 31% maximum individual rate in effect in 1990.
167. GENERAL MOTORS, INC., 1991 ANNUAL REPORT (1992) (retained earnings and income tax
data). The calculation in text assumes the 31% maximum individual rate in effect in 1990 and
1991. Retained earnings may not accurately reflect undistributed profits. See supra note 164.
168. MOODY'S, supra note 165, at 6188. Safeway, Inc. recorded a net profit in 1990 of $195
million, but it still had a negative retained earnings in excess of $500 million. Id. Congress could
charge for the current year's undistributed profits consistent with its treatment of earnings and
profits, but that would be a variation of the pure deferred distributions tax model.
169. ANHEUSER-BUSCH COMPANIES, INC., 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 45 (1992). Anheuser-
Busch's retained earnings for 1991 were $5.2 billion. It paid $387 million in federal income taxes
in 1991. Id. The calculation in the text assumes the 31% maximum individual rate in effect in
1991. Retained earnings may not accurately reflect undistributed profits. See supra note 164.
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investor's tax on the distribution. The wider the gap between the rate
the entity must pay and the rate the investor must pay, the longer the
investors are willing to leave assets under the manager's control. The
Treasury benefits by encouraging firms to distribute profits. The Treas-
ury, therefore, must monitor firms closely to separate those retaining
profits for legitimate business purposes from those taking advantage of
the arbitrage in tax rates.17 °
The deferred distributions tax has beneficial consequences beyond
those related to the agency cost analysis begetting it. The approach
would reduce the competitive barriers to entry for new firms. For exam-
ple, start-up firms pay the then-current rates for rental or purchase of
assets including real property. As the firm's longevity increases, espe-
cially if inflation pervades the economic environment, the firm benefits
through long-term leases or previous property acquisitions by experienc-
ing a reduced cash outlay for the same assets as contrasted with outlays
for comparable assets new entrees into the marketplace must incur. The
difference in necessary cash expenditures for essentially identical assets
favors established firms. A deferred distributions tax lower than the cur-
rent corporate tax leaves more money in start-up businesses for these
higher cash needs.
Start-up firms must utilize equity or debt financing, whereas more
established firms historically have retained profits in the business from
operations in addition to debt and equity financing.' 71 Since established
firms historically have not paid for the privilege of retaining profits that
otherwise would be distributed to investors annually, the government in
effect subsidizes well-established firms with large undistributed profits
at the expense of start-up firms. Under the deferred distributions tax
approach, firms all pay a deferred distributions tax on undistributed
profits, not merely on current year's taxable profits. The tax portion of
undistributed profits thus is more clearly recognized as a quasi-govern-
ment loan. Under a deferred distributions tax system, those firms that
have retained the most profits over the years pay more as quasi-interest
than they do currently as income charges. Those with only a short his-
tory to accumulate profits likely will pay less than under current law.
The deferred distributions tax eliminates some sticky problems
under current law. Since the firm does not pay a traditional income tax,
the distinction between debt and equity and between interest and divi-
170. See supra text accompanying notes 147-148 (discussing penalty for unreasonable
accumulated earnings).
171. See, e.g., DEP'T OF TREASURY, supra note 3, at 8-9 (94.1% of new sources of funds are
internally raised funds, contrasted with a decrease in equity issues in virtually every year during
the 1980s).
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dends 72 becomes irrelevant. Distributions of both interest and divi-
dends reduce the undistributed profits subject to the charge. Likewise,
the distinction between dividends and compensation1 73 ceases to be
important to the business since both reduce undistributed earnings.
Congress would lose some opportunities to use the tax laws for
economic incentives or other public policy purposes but could retain
others. For example, fines and kickbacks currently denied as deduc-
tions1 74 would reduce undistributed profits. Tax-exempt income t 75 may
become subject to the deferred distributions tax or special provisions
could exclude them. Congress als0 could exclude from the deferred dis-
tributions tax amounts paid to qualified retirement plans.1 76 Unfortu-
nately, the natural tension between the firm, which wants to qualify for a
tax deduction and the recipients of many payments that may or may not
be included in income, depending upon how the firm characterizes them,
would disappear. For example, the deferred distributions tax would not
distinguish compensation from untaxed fringe benefits and gifts. A firm
reduces its undistributed profits for both. Therefore, the firm would
have less incentive to characterize any fringe benefits as taxable income
to recipients.
1 77
In summary, the deferred distributions tax would not be an income
tax on the firm but a charge for the use of the government's tax dollars
kept from the Treasury because the manager has not distributed the prof-
its to the investors. The charge for the delay in taxation is placed on the
firm because the manager controls the distributions and possesses the
assets the profits represent. 178 Start-up companies and businesses that
distribute profits soon after earning them would pay less deferred distri-
butions tax than they currently pay in income tax. On the other hand,
entities that finance operations by retaining profits, rather than by bor-
rowing or issuing more stock, would pay a higher deferred distributions
tax than they now pay in federal income taxes.
172. See BrrrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 16, 4.01-4.03, at 4-1 to 4-27; see also id. 4.02, at
4-6 ("A 1969 attempt by Congress to pass the definitional buck to the Treasury proved to be a
fiasco.").
173. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7 to -9 (1960).
174. I.R.C. § 162(c) (West 1992).
175. I.R.C. § 103 (West 1992).
176. I.R.C. §§ 401-409 et. seq. (West 1992).
177. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(1), 117, 119, 129 & 132 (West 1992); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21
(1989).
178. This deferred distributions tax should be imposed in addition to any entity tax or
accumulated earnings tax. This article is premised, however, on the deferred distributions tax
being implemented at the same time the current entity tax is removed from the Code. A deferred
distributions tax may serve as a substitute for the current double taxation by taxing investors on
distributions and not taxing the entity on its income, assessing instead a deferred distributions tax




Agency cost analysis sheds light on the entity classification, entity
taxation, and two-tier taxation debates. Since the imposition of the tax
laws created the agency costs, Congress should permit entity taxation if
entity taxation reduces the agency costs. Entity taxation reduces agency
costs by forcing the manager to make business decisions based on the
entity's tax consequences rather than on her own. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, entity taxation forecloses the manager's externalizing all tax con-
siderations in her decisionmaking. Entity taxation also reduces agency
costs by requiring the manager, as the person in control of the assets
generated by the firm's profitable operations, to pay the resulting tax
liability.
Passthrough taxation is appropriate where the investors are also the
managers who make the disposition and distribution decisions or where
the investors are the laborers in a labor-intensive business so that distri-
butions closely approximate profits. Finally, passthrough taxation
seems a preferred option where the firm reports taxable losses that can
reduce an investor's tax liability without injuring the firm's cash
resources.
The double tax, first on the entity and then on the investors who
receive distributions, also reduces agency costs as long as the combined
taxes assessed against the entity and the investors are not excessive.
First, the entity pays a tax so the manager must make disposition deci-
sions taking tax into consideration. Second, investors do not pay any tax
on the firm's income until they receive distributions, thereby reducing
conflicts over distributions. Third, a lower entity tax rate encourages
investors to leave profits in the organization until the return the manager
gets from capital after paying the entity tax is less than the return inves-
tors could get after paying the tax calculated at their individual rates.
This latter merit should placate managers who want to retain capital and
want to avoid erratic demands for distributions. Fourth, the investors
pay the same tax rate as on other income so they would not necessarily
prefer distributions from the firm when other investments or personal
needs require capital. Finally, and in light of the foregoing benefits, the
entity tax serves as a charge by the government for the entity's opportu-
nity to defer income recognition by their investors. This reduces the
agency costs between the taxpayers and the government in its status as
statutory creditor.
Instead of treating the entity tax as a currently assessed income tax,
this article recommends substituting a deferred distributions tax for the
current entity tax. The deferred distributions tax would approximate an
interest charge on the tax that would be assessed against the investors if
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the firm distributed its accumulated undistributed profits to its investors.
The deferred distributions tax more precisely would be applied against
all undistributed earnings rather than solely against the current period's
income.
